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NOTES
THE CORPORATION AS A FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DEvicE-The extent to
which the functions of modern government are of a commercial and industrial
character becomes increasingly demonstrable during periods of economic mis-
fortune.1 Credit and banking reorganization, 2. housing,3 mortgages,4 insur-
ance,5 and power production,8 are the more outstanding examples of fields of
which the federal government has taken possession in an unparalleled effort to
administer the requirements of a people floundering in the midst of the business
chaos attendant upon an era of supererogated finance.7 Among the most strik-
ing media for administering problems previously considered outside the rightful
domain of government, and for the proper handling of which, therefore, no
precise federal machinery existed, is the government corporation.
Yet, the use of the corporate form as an instrument for the administration
of the business of government is not novel. The earliest situation where the
corporate device was adopted to perform governmental functions was in the
case of the Bank of North America, created in 1781 by the Continental Con-
gress and used by that body in the operation of the fiscal affairs of an infant
government.8 And shortly after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, there
was created the first Bank of the United States, 9 followed within a little more
than two decades by the second Bank of the United States.10 At this time, in
a suit involving the latter bank, Chief Justice Marshall in the famous opinion
of McCulloch v. Maryland " decided that Congress had the necessary power to
create corporations as federal instrumentalities.
It was not, however, until the late World War that any great use was made
of the corporation for federal administrative purposes. Only ten days after the
United States entered the War, the United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation was created pursuant to a statute 12 authorizing the United
States Shipping Board to form one or more corporations. The necessity for a
rapid concert of action in diverse fields, hitherto foreign to federal activity, saw
I. See BEARD, THE AMERICAN LEVIATHAN (1930) passim.
2. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 47 STAT. 5, 15 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (932);
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 48 STAT. I68, 12 U. S. C. A. § 264 (1933) ; Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation Act, 48 STAT. 1256, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1701 (1934);
Commodity Credit Corporation, Executive Order No. 6340, October 6, 1933.
3. Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation, Executive Order No. 647o, Novem-
ber 29, 1933, issued under authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 200,
40 U. S. C. A. § 401 (a) (1933) ; Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation, established on
December 2, 1933, by an order of the Secretary of the Interior.
4. Home Owners Loan Corporation Act, 48 STAT. 129, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (1933).
5. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 48 STAT. I68, 12 U. S. C. A. § 264 (1933);
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Act, 48 STAT. 1256, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1701
(1934).
6. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 STAT. 58, 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 (1933).
7. ScHmEcKwiai, NEw FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS (1934) contains a complete outline of
contemporary governmental activity.
8. HocKErT, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1931) 183.
9. i STAT. 191 (1791)-
10. 3 STAT. 266 (1816).
11. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig). With this decision as authority, a whole national banking
system was established pursuant to legislative enactments in successive years until as recently
as 1932, when the Federal Home Loan Banks were established. 47 STAT. 725 (932), 12 U. S.
C. A. § 142i et seq. (1933).
12. 39 STAT. 731 (I916), 46 U. S. C. A. § 8io (I933). The corporation was organized
under the general incorporation laws of the District of Columbia, with power to purchase,
construct and operate merchant vessels.
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the creation in rapid succession of the United States Grain Corporation,'13 for
the purpose of buying and selling foodstuffs, the United States Spruce Cor-
poration,' 4 to aid in the production of aircraft materials, the United States
Housing Corporation, 5 for the purpose of providing housing for the war needs
of workers, and the War Finance Corporation 16 to lend financial assistance to
industries important to the successful prosecution of the War. After the Proc-
lamation of Peace, and the passing of the crisis, these corporations were grad-
ually dissolved until today there is left remaining of them only the Fleet Cor-
poration.
The following years of economic expansion and the resumption by gov-
ernment of its more normal administrative pursuits, saw the creation of but two
government owned corporations, both of a more permanent structure than the
ones utilized during the War. The Inland Waterways Corporation 1- was
organized by the Secretary of War to operate the government owned inland
waterways system, and the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks " were formed
to avoid the existing difficulties in the way of agricultural financing.
However, coincident again with a period of novel governmental activity,
the depression has stimulated the use of the corporation as an important agency
for administering a multifarious federal program. The key corporate agency
utilized during the present emergency is the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion,' created during the Hoover Administration. Unlike most of the war-
time corporations, it was created by act of Congress and not under the laws
of any individual state. The capital stock is entirely owned by the United
States, and the management is vested in a board of directors consisting of the
Secretary of the Treasury and six others appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Originally designed to replenish the
meagre resources of financial institutions so that they might assist the urgent
needs of agriculture, commerce and industry, the purposes of the Corporation
were extended far beyond its original scope so that loans could be made in the
light of an expanded policy "to relieve destitution . . . and to create employ-
ment by providing for and expediting a public-works program". 20  Conse-
quently, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation may make loans to banks,
trust companies, building and loan associations, railroads (after approval by the
Interstate Commerce Commission), insurance companies, mortgage loan com-
panies, credit unions, federal land banks, agricultural credit corporations, states,
territories, political subdivisions of states and private corporations constructing
public works. " ' In addition, various enactments have required the Corporation
to finance other government organizations and corporations. 22 Besides its orig-
inal capital, realized by the sale of its stock to the United States, the Corpora-
tion is financed by the issuance of bonds all of which have been purchased by
the Secretary of the Treasury.
Among the numerous other recently organized government corporations
are the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,2 ' the Federal Savings and Loan
13. 40 STAT. 276 (1917) (incorporated in Delaware).
14. 40 STAT. 888 (I918), 5o U. S. C. A. § 172 (1928) (incorporated in the District ofColumbia).15. 4o STAT. 550 (I9I8) (incorporated in the District of Columbia).
16. 40 STAT. 5o6 (198), 15 U. S. C. A. § 331 (927).
17. 43 STAT. 36o (1924), 49 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1929).
I8. 42 STAT. 1454 (I923), 12 U. S. C. A. § lO21 et seq. (1933).
19. 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (1933). This Act has frequently been
amended. See pamphlet issued by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation entitled, Recon-
struction Finance Corporation Act as Amended (Govt. Printing Office, 1934).
20. 47 STAT. 709, 39 U. S. C. A. § 277 (1932).
21. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, as Amended (Govt. Printing Office, 1934).
22. SCHarECKEBIER, NEw FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS (1934) 58.
23. 48 STAT. 168, 12 U. S. C. A. §264 (933) (to aid in the liquidation of insolvent
banks and administer a program of bank deposit insurance).
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Insurance Corporation,2 4 the Home Owners Loan Corporation, 2  the Public
Works Emergency Housing Corporation,
" the Tennessee Valley Authority,
2 '
the Commodity Credit Corporation, 28 and the Federal Subsistence Homestead
Corporation.
29
In creating these corporations, various methods have been utilized. The
corporation may be established as such by act of Congress 30 defining its powers
and limitations and declaring it to be a body corporate. Or Congress may pro-
vide for the creation by specified executive officers of a corporation as the agency
to execute the provisions of the directing statute.2 1 Frequently such corpora-
tions may come into being as the result of an executive order issued under the
authority of a statute providing generally that a specified executive shall "estab-
lish such agencies as he may find necessary",32  In both of the latter cases the
agency is incorporated under the general incorporation statutes of some state
or the District of Columbia. While Delaware is the most common state of in-
corporation-due, perhaps, to the many purposes for which incorporation is
there permitted and the ease with which charters may be obtained-no real
reason can be discovered why in a particular case articles of incorporation are
applied for elsewhere.
The management is entrusted to a board of directors, most frequently com-
posed of members of some already existing administrative body " or appointed
by the President and holding office for some specified period. 4  The capital
necessary to carry out the corporate purposes is usually obtained by a sale of
stock to the United States in return for cash, or, as in the case of non-stock
corporations like the Tennesee Valley Authority, cash capital may be raised
by the sale of bonds guaranteed by the United States. Another manner of pro-
viding corporate capital is by statutory authorization directing the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation to advance particular sums or to subscribe to the
capital stock issue. In the case of the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation
24. 48 STAT. 1256 (1934) (to provide a program of insurance for accounts in building
and loan associations and co-operative banks).
25. 48 STAT. 129, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (933) (to make loans directly to home owners
to replace existing mortgages and to provide funds for taxes and repairs).
26. Executive Order No. 6470 of November 29, 1933, designated the corporation, which
was organized in Delaware on October 28, 1933, as an agency of the federal government un-
der authority of tit. II of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 200, 40 U. S. C. A.
§ 401 (a) (933). The purpose of the corporation is to construct and repair buildings and
lend financial aid in slum clearance and housing projects.
27. 48 STAT. 58, 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 (933) (to take over and operate the Muscle Shoals
property and to direct the development of a huge power plant and a flood control and reforesta-
tion scheme, among other enumerated purposes in a general plan for the development of the
Tennessee Valley district).
28. Executive Order No. 6340, October 16, 1933 (to provide immediate benefits to farmers
from the expected increase in prices resulting from acreage curtailment under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act).
29. Established by order of the Secretary of the Interior on December 2, 1933. to aid
in the purchase of homesteads. An excellent survey of the setup of all of the recently cre-
ated governmental agencies up to July I, 1934, is contained in SCHMECxEBIER, NE W FEDERAL
ORGANIZATIOKS (1934).
30. Of this type there is the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 47 STAT. 5 (932), 15
U. S. C. A. § 6oi (I933), and the Tennessee Valley Authority, 48 STAT. 58, 16 U. S. C. A.
§831 (1933).
31. Home Owners Loan Corporation, 48 STAT. 128, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1462 (I33); Pro-
duction Credit Corporation, 48 STAT. 259 (1933); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
48 STAT. 168, 12 U. S. C. A. §264 0933).
32. Commodity Credit Corporation, established October 16, 1933, by Executive Order
No. 6340; Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation by Executive Order No. 6470.
33. Thus the directors of the Commodity Credit Corporation consist of officers of the
Department of Agriculture, the Farm Credit Administration and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation.
34. The board of directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for example, is
appointed by the President.
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the capital stock was subscribed by the Home Owners Loan Corporation; simi-
larly the capital for the Co-operative Banks was furnished through the medium
of the Farm Credit Administration. 5
In view of the varying ends to be accomplished, necessitating different
schemes of organization, no uniform share structure is used. Thus voting 3 6 or
non-voting 37 shares may be issued, the share arrangement may provide for
classes of shares divided into common and preferred stock,88 or for the distri-
bution of cumulative dividends.3 9 In most cases the United States is the sole
shareholder, although in some instances the right of an institution to participate
in the benefits incident to the corporate activity may be conditioned on its be-
coming a shareholder.40 It is particularly in cases where the capital stock is not
exclusively owned by the United States that the varying incidents of the share
structure become important. Thus in the case of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, shareholder banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System have no voting privileges due to the fact that they are the
least responsible shareholders of the Corporation. Also, by becoming, of prac-
tical necessity, shareholders of the Corporation and having no vote, their poli-
cies and practices are thereby brought to some extent within the control of
Federal Reserve member shareholders. Likewise, where shareholdership by
parties other than the United States is contemplated, preferences incident to
classes of shares held by the federal government are advisable to insure federal
investment and control. Where, however, this is not intended, and the corpo-
ration is organized on a completely non-profit basis, it is not unusual to find the
total absence of a capital stock structure.4 Dissolution of the corporation may
be provided for in the enactment creating it, thereby limiting the duration
of the corporation to a fixed period of years,42 or the corporate life may be
concluded by a subsequent act of Congress so directing.
While the factual structure of the federal corporation does not differ radically
from that of the private business corporation, and like the latter is in each case
adapted to the practical necessities of an intended field of operation, the legal
consequences incident to federal corporate acts differ in many significant respects.
Nor is this surprising in view of their dual nature as both governmental agency
35. The methods whereby funds for the various corporations were obtained are set forth
in considerable detail in ScHmEcK R, NEW FFERAL ORGANIZATIONS (1934) passim.
36. Electric Home & Farm Authority, Inc., Executive Order No. 6514, December 19,
1933, and the Second Export-Import Bank of Washington, D. C., Executive Order No. 6638,
are examples.
37. Only the common stock of the first Export-Import Bank of Washington, D. C., Ex-
ecutive Order No. 6581, February 3, 1934, is voted. Stock held by banks, other than Federal
Reserve Banks, is without vote at shareholders' meetings of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 48 STAT. 168, 12 U. S. C. A. § 264 (1933).
38. This is the case in both of the Export-Import Banks of Washington, D. C., Execu-
tive Order No. 6581, February 2, 1934, and Executive Order No. 6638.
39. All the stockholders of the Federal Home Loan Banks share equally in dividends,
except that stock held by the United States is entitled to cumulative dividends at the rate of
2% per annmon. 47 STAT. 729, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1426 (k) (1932).
4o. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is the outstanding illustration of this.
The United States subscribed to 15o millions of the stock. Each Federal Reserve member
must subscribe to stock equal to one-half of its surplus on January I, 1933. Every national
bank and state bank member of the Federal Reserve system must subscribe to stock equal to
one-half of 1% of its total deposit liabilities. Banks not members of the Federal Reserve
system may subscribe to stock up io July I, 1937, after which insurance benefits will accrue
only to member banks. Subscriptions to capital stock must be adjusted annually in proportion
to deposits.
41. Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, organized in Delaware by the Secretary of Agri-
culture October 4, 1933; Tennessee Valley Authority, 48 STAT. 58, 16 U. S. C. A. § 831
(1933).-
42. Home Owners Loan Corporation, 48 STAT. 128, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1462 (1933) ; Re-
construction Finance Corporation, 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (i933).
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and private corporation. That the legal characteristics normally attributable to a
sovereign instrumentality are not always present is not due to a misapprehension
of legal principles any more than is the fact that the agency is not necessarily
governed by the normal rules of corporation law. The fact that structurally
the body is a corporation may make a particular result desirable, but since at the
same time it is teleologically a federal administrative agency, the considerations
that must be taken into account may make a totally different legal conclusion
advisable. The cases are frequently colored by language that would seem to
indicate an inconsistency in result, if not in policy as well; but the courts, guided
by unexpressed pragmatic considerations, have developed a body of law sui
generis to the federal owned corporation, which can be justified in view of the
hybrid status of these agencies.
Perhaps the most striking feature distinguishing the government corporation
from other administrative bodies is its liability to suit. In the leading case of
Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation,43 the Supreme Court held decisively that the Corporation was not
entitled to the sovereign's immunity from a suit brought to compel the rescission
of a contract allegedly induced by duress. Likewise, federal corporations have
been held liable to suit in actions for tort.44 The theory of the Court in the Sloan
case was that the corporation was an entity distinct from the government and,
therefore, does not partake of its sovereign immunity, and that "the fact that the
corporation was formed under the general laws of the District of Columbia is
persuasive, even standing alone, that it was expected . . . to stand suit in its
own person . . ." 4 Aside from predication on these two grounds, the right
to sue a federal corporation has been rationalized on the theories (i) that in
order to protect the rights of citizens the sovereign immunity should not extend
to an incorporated agent;46 (2) that when the corporation acts in its capacity of
a private corporation, it is liable to suit, but when it acts as an agent of the federal
government it shares in the latter's immunity ;47 and (3) that when the govern-
ment engages in private business activity, it gives up its sovereign attributes."8
No single theory seems to afford a completely satisfactory basis for subjecting
these agencies to suit.49 Whatever the proper analysis, the courts are influenced
43. 258 U. S. 549 (1922). For an earlier expression of this view see Bank of the U. S.
v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904 (U. S. 1824) (held not violative of the Ilth
Amendment) ; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318 (U. S. 1829).
44. American Cotton Oil Co. v. United States Fleet Corp., 270 Fed. 296 (D. C. La.
392); Panama Ry. v. Minnix, 282 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). In cases involving state
boards and commissions, some cases have permitted suits for breach of contract, Stern v.
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 50 Wash. ioo, 96 Pac. 693 (1908), but not for the commis-
sion of torts, Maia's Adm'r v. Eastern Hospital, 97 Va. 507, 34 S. E. 617 (1899).
45. 258 U. S. 549, 570 (1922).
46. Gould Coupler Co. v. United States Fleet Corp., 261 Fed. 716 (S. D. N. Y. 1919);
see Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 Fed. 575,
587 (S. D. N. Y. i92o).
47. Ingram Day Lumber Co. v. United States Fleet Corp., 267 Fed. 283 (S. D. Miss.
392o); see Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 44o (E. D. Pa. 1919). For
cases where it was held that the corporation is not liable where it acts as an agent of the
United States see Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Ry., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) ; Keeley
v. Kerr, 270 Fed. 874 (D. Ore. i921); but cf. Roper v. Public Works Commission, [1915]
i K. B. 45.
48. Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 261 Fed. 716 (S. D. N. Y. i919); Federal
Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y.
192o) ; United States v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 28 F. (2d) 373 (W. D. Wash. 3928) ; The
No. 34, II F. (2d) 287 (D. Mass. 1925). That this is not the real reason is shown by cases
where government agencies other than corporations have engaged in fields of private en-
deavor and have been held immune from suit. Cohn v. United States Shipping Board, 20 F.
(2d) 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); Zink v. Black Star Line, Inc., i8 F. (2d) 156 (D. C. App.
I927).
49. For a detailed criticism of these theories, see Note (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 786.
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by the fact that they are dealing with what in form is a corporation,5" and there-
fore think in terms of law applicable to corporations, combined with the desir-
ability of relaxing the theory of sovereign immunity in favor of the equitable
adjustment of claims held by those dealing with the government. 51
That the corporation cannot consistently ne considered an entity completely
separate from its sovereign shareholder has been illustrated in cases involving
"real party in interest" and counterclaim and set-off. Where the corporation
clearly acts as "agent" of the federal government, it has been held that the United
States is a proper party plaintiff despite its corporate guise.52 Since, however,
by hypothesis, government corporations are governmental agencies, it is difficult
to discover when they will be considered not to have acted as agents, although
the few cases where it was denied that the United States was a real party in
interest have justified themselves on this basis.13 However, greater recognition
of the fact that the corporation is but a federal administrative device has been
given in cases holding that the United States may counterclaim or set off claims
owned by the Fleet Corporation in a suit on a contract entered into by that
agency. 4 So, too, in a suit by the federal government, it has been recognized that
the defendant may set off claims asserted against the corporation, at least up to
the amount of the corporate claim that the United States seeks to establish.5 5
In considering the question of the jurisdiction in cases in which a government
corporation is a party, the rules that have been established are not unexpected.
Where the agency has been chartered as a body corporate by act of Congress, the
corporation is treated as a domestic corporation by every state where it carries
on its affairs.5 For the purpose, however, of giving the federal courts jurisdic-
tion by way of diversity of citizenship, it is not considered a citizen of any of the
states.5 7 The mere fact that the corporation has received its charter from the
5o. That more importance is attached to the manner in which a state carries on an activ-
ity than on the nature of the activity, insofar as liability to suit is concerned, is illustrated
by Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, ii Pet. 257 (U. S. 1837), where a bank in which Kentucky
was sole shareholder was held subject to suit, whereas in Cunningham v. Macon & Bruns-
wick R. R., Io9 U. S. 446 (1885), a receiver operating a railroad for the state was declared
immune to suit. It has been suggested that the federal government should be liable to suit in
any controversy arising out of conduct not involving "sovereign power". McGuire, Govern-
ment by Corporations (1928) 14 VA. L. REV. i82.
51. The rule has been extended so as to subject corporations owned by foreign govern-
ments to suit. Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse Des Charbons, Basle, 21 F. (2d) 18o
(S. D. N. Y. 1927). For a discussion of the liability of state owned corporations, see Note
(924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 427.
52. Erickson v. United States, 264 U. S. 246 (1924) ; United States v. Czarnkow-Rionda
Co., 4o F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 2d, i93o), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 844 (893o) ; United States v.
Gano-Moore Co., 35 F. (2d) 395 (E. D. Pa. 1929) ; Russel Wheel & Foundry Co. v. United
State, 31 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
53. Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 294 Fed. 641 (C. C. A.
2d, 1923) even though the mortgages in question described the corporation as representing the
United States, although in United States v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 55 F. (2d) 377
(S. D. N. Y. 8932), the case may have turned on the fact that the bonds were under seal and
the words describing the corporation as representing the United States considered descriptio
personae.
54. Crane v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 734 (Ct. Claims 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S.
6oi (1932).
55. Skiziner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1 (927) ; United States v. Skinner &
Eddy Corp., 28 F. (2d) 373 (W. D. Wash. 1928).
56. Twin Falls Nat. Bank v. Reed, 44 Idaho 573, 258 Pac. 526 (927) (statute providing
prerequisites to foreign corporations doing business within state, held inapplicable to national
banks) ; Commonwealth v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 98 Pa. 9o (1881) (license and tax fee held in-
applicable on theory that federally chartered corporation is not a foreign corporation) ; Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Weatherby, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 409, 92 S. W. 58 (906) (held, domestic cor-
poration for jurisdictional purposes within the state).
57. Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 U. S. 295 (196).
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federal government does not involve a federal question ;58 there must be the
additional fact that the United States owns more than one-half of the corpora-
tion's capital stock,5 9 or that a national bank is a party to the litigation, ° in order
that a federal question be at issue."- Where, however, the corporation operates
under articles of incorporation granted by a state, the rule is that it is a domestic
corporation of that state and consequently is a citizen of that state for the purpose
of invoking federal jurisdiction on the theory of diversity of citizenship. 2 Exclu-
sive legislative jurisdiction of activity by federal corporations involving lands
owned by them-desirable in that a minimum of state interference with a pro-
gram of national housing, for example, may thereby be obtained-may be acquired
by state cession. 8 While the acquisition of jurisdiction in this manner is subject
to Constitutional limitations, 4 both a liberal construction '- and the broad scope
of state statutes permitting cession have combined to extend the number of pur-
poses for which exclusive jurisdiction may be obtained.66
In the field of substantive law, too, the decisions have demonstrated the dual
aspect of the corporate agency. When it is realized that among the fundamental
questions underlying each case is how far shall it be equitable or politic to divest
a federal instrumentality of sovereign attributes because its operative form is
that of a private corporation, the results reached by the courts have for the most
part been fair. An interesting line of cases illustrating the alternative features
of the government owned corporation is that dealing with criminal statutes and
the status of federal employees. In United States v. Strang 17 an inspector of
the Fleet Corporation was held not to come within the purview of Section 41 of
the United States Criminal Code which prohibits a member of a firm contracting
with the United States from being an agent of the federal government, the Court
"deciding" that the Fleet Corporation was an entity separate from the national
government. Later, however, it was held that a fraud against the Fleet Corpora-
tion was a fraud against the United States under the section of the Criminal Code
which imposed liability on persons defrauding the United States. s And although
the decision was properly governed by Section 35, making it a crime to assert
fraudulent claims against any corporation in which the United States is a share-
holder, as much stress was laid by the Court on the fact that pecuniary loss would
58. 43 STAT. 941 (I25), 28 U. S. C. A. § 42 (1927) ; Federal Land Bank v. United
States Nat. Bank, 13 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Fithian, 43 F. (2d) 866 (E. D. Il1. 1930).
59. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Mitchell, 277 U. S. 213 (1928) ; 43 STAT. 941
(,925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 42 (927) ; 48 STAT. 266, 12 U. S. C. A. § 138 (933), provides that
even this added fact will be insufficient in the case of the Production Credit Corporation.
6o. This is limited to cases involving the national banking laws. 18 STAT. 320 (1875), 12
U. S. C. A. § 94 (927).
61. DomE, FzEEAL JtRxsDicriON AND PROCFDIRE (1928) §62.
62. Id. § 65.
63. Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1885) ; United States v. Tucker,
122 Fed. 518 (W. D. Ky. i9o3).
64. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8 (17) provides for exclusive Congressional legislation
. . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the same shall be, for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dockyards, and other need-
ful Buildings. . . ." In view of the intention that the italicized words be construed ejusdein
generis, it is not altogether a closed question whether buildings constructed by corporations
like the Public Works Emergency Housing !Corporation fall within the meaning of the Consti-
tution. Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 (1929); In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545 (E. D.
Wis. I895).
65. Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 796; Note (1929) 74 L. ED. 761.
66. But see Lieber, Cessions of Jurisdiction by States to the United States (898) 32
Am. L. REv. 78.
67. 254 U. S. 491 (92). Contra: Salas v. United States, 234 Fed. 842 (C. C. A. 2d,
1916).
68. 40 STAT. 1015 (1918), 18 U. S. C. A. §80 (1927).
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have resulted to the United States, and the efficiency of the federal agency im-
paired thereby. And it has been held that gold owned by the Corporation was
property of the United States where the real question at issue was whether a
naval officer should receive for its shipment the extra compensation to
which he would have a valid claim if a private corporation were involved.6 9  On
the other hand the holding of office both in the Corporation and in another gov-
ernmental capacity was regarded as not constituting the holding of two federal
offices."' In none of these cases, however, was it necessary for the Court to decide
that the Corporation was either an entity separate or identical with the national
government. While it may be expedient to permit a person to hold two federal
offices, either as an economy or more effectively to centralize the policies of the
incumbent administration where unhampered action is of the essence, for criminal
purposes it may be equally advisable to entertain the conclusion that a fraud
against the Corporation is a fraud against the United States. In one case to hide
behind a corporate fiction and in the next to discard it, is not only to reach a
result by adopting the conclusion in the first premise but is also to resort to
unnecessary and frequently anomalous language.
Whatever the nature of the judicial process relied upon, the controlling
consideration is not, as would be expected, the protection of the United
States from pecuniary loss in its transactions by means of the corporate device.
This is illustrated by the fact that the corporation is not accorded priority
over other creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.7 1 Likewise, laches72 and
the statute of limitations 73 may be successfully pleaded as defenses to a
suit by the corporation. But, although in dealing through corporations the gov-
ernment has in many respects surrendered its sovereign prerogative, this is only
true while the corporation is in active operation. When the United States takes
over the corporation's property and sues on contracts made by the corporation,
third parties cannot set up the statute of limitations 1 or laches 7 as a defense.
In many respects the corporation has sovereign characteristics and it is
upon its nature as a public agency that emphasis is most usually placed. Conse-
quently when an attempt was made to collect private telegraph rates, the cor-
poration was held to be entitled to the lower rates accorded to the government."8
The Court placed the greatest weight on the fact that the United States owned
all of the capital stock and that the payment of private rates would be an undue
burden on the public exchequer. National and Federal Reserve Banks, how-
ever, are not accorded the same privileges in view of their operation through
private capital. The case of Commercial Pacific Cable Co. V. Philippine Na-
tional Bank 7 was distinguished on the ground that only 85 per cent. of the
stock was held by the Philippine government.
On the theory that it would be an interference with the exercise of gov-
ernmental functions, the fe6eral courts have adopted the view that a govern-
ment corporation is not subject to attachment or garnishment,8 nor may
69. United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. io6 (1923).
7o. Dalton v. United States, 71 Ct. Claims 421 (1931).
71. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 54! (1922) ; W.
Va. Rail Co. v. Jewett Bigelow & Brooks Coal Co., 26 F. (2d) 5o3 (E. D. Ky. 1928).
72. The No. 34, 1i F. (2d) 287 (D. Mass. 1925).
73. United States Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U. S. 202 (1927); Lindgren v.
United States Fleet Corp., 55 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
74. United States v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 211, i6o N. E. 13 (1928).
75. United States v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 4o F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
76. United States Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 415 (1928).
77. 263 Fed. 218 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
78. McCarthy v. United States Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (D. C. App. 1931). There
is some state authority to the contrary. Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92,
Iio Atil. 788 (192o).
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admiralty act in ren by seizing its property. 9 Per contra, the private corpora-
tion aspect is again stressed in a holding that parties contracting with the cor-
poration may look only to corporate assets for the satisfaction of their claims.8 0
Another important feature of the use of the corporation in the administra-
tion of federal affairs involves its relationship to state and local governments
with respect to police power and taxability. Although the power of the federal
corporation to act with reference to state regulations has not been directly
passed upon by the judiciary, the attitude of the Supreme Court in analogous
situations seems to afford a sufficient parallel upon which to base the conclusion
that federal corporations are immune from local regulations even though they
are based upon an exercise of the local police power. Such exemption is
grounded "upon the entire absence of power on the part of the states to touch
the instrumentalities of the United States".8 ' The frequency with which such
statements have been made8" is ground for a reasonable prediction that a cor-
poration like the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation may act inde-
pendently of local building laws. A pointed clue may be found in the recent
case of Arizona v. California,8 3 where, despite a state statute to the contrary,
it was held that the plans and specifications of Boulder Dam need not be sub-
mitted to the approval of the state authorities. And Mr. Justice Field, in Pen-
bina Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,84 has stated that:
"The only limitation upon the power of the state to exclude a foreign
corporation from doing business within its limits . . . or to exact condi-
tions for allowing the corporation to do business there, arises where the
corporation is in the employ of the federal government, or where the busi-
ness is strictly commerce interstate or foreign."
From its past attitude, therefore, and the present necessity for government cor-
porations to act freely and swiftly in fields where inactivity would defeat the
whole purpose of the recovery program, it is very doubtful that the Supreme
Court will fail to apply its numerous dicta.
Of their own initiative, furthermore, it has been the customary policy of
the corporations to avoid major conflicts with state requirements. For example,
where a statute forbade foreign corporations from holding real property in the
state, the United States Housing Corporation resorted to the device of taking
title in the name of the United States or in the name of a domestic corporation
formed as a holding corporation for the express purpose of taking title. 5
The immunity of federal owned corporations from state taxation or local
assessments, except so far as Congress permits, seems fairly well established,
although the cases are not always clear as to whether they are based on the
theory of the immunity of public instrumentalities 86 or that the property of the
corporation is the property of the government.8 7  But irrespective of what
79. See United States Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U. S. 202 (1927).
8o. United States Fleet Corp. v. Hardwood, 281 U. S. 59 (1929).
81. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 326 (U. S. 18ig) ; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S.
325, 341 (192o) ; cf. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (932).
82. Fort Leavenworth Ry. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1885) ; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1
(1889) ; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899) ; Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank v. Minne-
sota, 232 U. S. 516 (914); Stockton v. Balto. & N. Y. R. R., 32 Fed. 9 (D. N. J. 1887);
State v. Burton, 41 R. I. 303, 103 Atl. 962 (igi8) ; see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylva-
nia, 240 U. S. 319, 323 (296) ; Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 52, 56 (1920).
83. 283 U. S. 423 (930).
84. 125 U. S. 181, I9O (1888).
85. Report of the U. S. Housing Corporation (Govt. Printing Office, 192o) Vol. I.
86. United States v. Coghlan, 261 Fed. 425 (D. Md. 2919) ; De la Vergne Mach. Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 211 App. Div. 227, 207 N. Y. Supp. 68o (3d Dep't 1925), aff'd, 241
N. Y. 5,7, ,so N. E. 536 (,925).
87. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923).
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theory they adopt, courts have as a general rule refused to uphold the validity
of a tax either upon the means of carrying on governmental functions, 8 or upon
the property held by the corporation."9  Likewise the assessment of a state tax
upon the net income of the corporation was declared invalid as a tax upon
income accruing to the United States and therefore a tax upon federal prop-
erty.b However, property sold by a corporation is subject to taxation in the
hands of the purchaser who has paid the full purchase price,91 although it has
been held that where the legal title remains in the corporation until the full pay-
ment of the purchase price, the property is not taxable to the .purchaser who
holds only the equitable interest. 92 The hardship of depriving the state of tax
revenue has, however, in the past been mitigated by the policy of the United
States Housing Corporation to make agreements with local authorities to pay
amounts equal to what it would have paid as special assessments and ad valorem
taxes had it not been free from possible taxation.9 3 Congress has further lim-
ited the application of the rule of law permitting absolute tax exemption by
suspending its operation upon the real property held by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation,94 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 95 and the
Home Owners Loan Corporation.98 And in the case of the Central Bank for
Co-operatives, the Production Credit Corporation, Production Credit Associa-
tions and Banks for Co-operatives, Congress has provided for the taxation of
both real and personal property. 7  That in the one group of corporations only
realty and in the other group both realty and personalty is subject to taxation,
is not attributable to anything but the frequent accident of legislative drafts-
manship. In view of the taxability of so much of the corporate property it is
not likely that the freedom from other types of taxation will result in a with-
drawal of local privileges and facilities afforded private taxpayers, particularly
in light of the many other material advantages, in the form of slum clearance,
for example, accruing to the state from the operations of the corporations and
their purpose of expediting recovery.
The use by the federal government of the corporate device in the scheme
of administering national problems has been the subject of considerable criti-
cism. However, the'issue has been too frequently obscured by the confusion of
two distinct questions: the power to engage in a particular type of activity 9s
and the advisability of using the corporation where the government is engaging
in an admittedly proper public function. The confusion is no doubt in major
part due to the normal association of the use of the corporation with periods
88. California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. I (1888); Owensboro Nat. Bank v.
Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664 (i899); Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 (912); Choctaw,
etc. R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292 (1914).
89. United States v. Coghlan, 261 Fed. 425 (D. Md. 1919) ; King County v. United States
Fleet Corp., 282 Fed. 95o (C. C. A. 9th, 1922) ; United States v. Clallam County, 283 Fed.
645 (W. D. Wash. 1922).
go. De la Vergne Mach. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 211 App. Div. 227, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 68o (3d Dep't 1925), aff'd, 241 N. Y. 517, I5O N. E. 536 (1925) ; cf. United States v.
Coghlan, 261 Fed. 425 (D. Md. i919).
9i. City of Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547 (1928) ; City of Philadelphia v.
Myers, io2 Pa. Super. 424, 157 Atl. 13 (1931).
92. Lincoln County v. Pacific Spruce Corp., 26 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. gth, 1928).
93. Report of the U. S. Housing Corporation (Govt. Printing Office, 192o) Vol. I. Sim-
ilar arrangements have already been made by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
94. 47 STAT. 9 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. 61o (1933).
95. 48 STAT. 177, 12 U. S. C. A. § 264 (p) (1933).
96. 48 STAT. 130, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (c) (1933).
97. 48 STAT. 267, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1138 (c) (933).
98. The constitutionality of the purposes for which government corporations have in the
last few years been organized is not within the scope of this note.
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when the activity of the national government is unusually pervasive. Where,
however, the propriety of the activity is admitted 99 the criticism involves only
the advisability of using the corporate machine to take care of government
business. As nearly as can be gathered from the cases discussing this,
.. . an important, if not the chief reason for employing these incor-
porated agencies was to enable them to employ commercial methods and to
conduct their operations with a freedom supposed to be inconsistent with
accountability to the Treasury under its established procedure of audit and
control over the financial transactions of the United States." 0
The particular feature of freedom of the federal corporation from audit by
the Comptroller-General has resulted in the greatest amount of comment,
both favorable and adverse. The danger most feared is that uncontrolled ex-
penditures, combined with the political appointment of unqualified officers and
directors, will make such agencies an easy prey to the acquisitiveness of a cor-
rupt political clan."" That this danger is more theoretical than real is illus-
trated by the fact that no such charges could be laid at the doors of the many
corporations organized during the War. Furthermore, what is frequently over-
looked entirely is that while no accountability to the Comptroller-General is
required, it is made incumbent upon the officers in charge of the administration
of the corporations to make periodic audits in accordance with established com-
mercial practice. And while no statute specifically defines the liability of the
managers of the corporations, it is inconceivable that any court will not hold
them responsible to a high degree of fidelity, more as a prophylactic measure,
of course, than as a method of recompensing corporate losses. And since it is
within the desire of Congress to see that the moneys appropriated are applied
to the purposes contemplated, the practice of requiring special Congressional
audits 102 will achieve the effect of pertinent and honest expenditures. Counter-
acting even the possibility of the honest but overzealous expenditures of any
biased group, is the policy of appointing directors with diversified political and
geographical interests. 0 3 Against the possibility of the misapplication of cor-
porate funds must also be considered the fact that in subjecting expenditures
to the control of the Comptroller-General the purposes of the corporation may
be defeated by the element of time delay. As was pointed out by Secretary of
the Interior Ickes, in a recent controversy 104 with Comptroller-General McCarl
on this very point, if the purchase of every piece of realty by the Public Works
Emergency Housing Corporation must await the approval of the Comptroller-
General, the funds of the Corporation would be frozen to the extent of prac-
tically nullifying its entire program. That at least one of the purposes of or-
ganizing corporations by the government was to avoid the paralysis of just this
type of red tape cannot be seriously questioned.'
99. The wartime corporations were justified as engaged in proper governmental activity
under the war powers of Congress. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923) ;
United States Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 415 (1928). Quwre, will the
fact of emergency justify contemporary federal activities?
ioo. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, 8 (1928). See Annual Report of the
Inland Waterways Corporation (Govt. Printing Office, 1925) 2.
ioi. The argument is made that all expenditures are subject to rigid control by the Comp-
troller-General under the General Accounting Office Act, 42 STAT. 23, 126 (192i), 31 U. S. C.
A. § 53 (1927). McGuire, Government by Corporations (1925) 14 VA. L. REv. 182.
io2. Such audits were authorized by 40 STAT. 634, 651 (1918) ; 42 STAT. 437, 444 (I922).
103. Section 3 of the Reconstruction Finance Act, 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A.
§6oi (1933).
io4- Tim, January 29, 1934, at 14. The matter was finally settled without resort to court
action.
io5. Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 Fed.
575, 587 (1920).
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Autonomous in nature, yet retaining the attributes of a federal agency, and
organically adapted to the efficient accomplishment of its purposes-all directly
or indirectly dealing with the complex business problems of finance and credit-
the record of the wartime corporations has been at least a factor influencing the
adoption of this device today.10 6 Compared with the work of the private dividend
corporations undertaking a task in New York in 1926 identical with that of the
United States Housing Corporation, the record of the latter stands out as a sur-
passing achievement.1 0" In the final analysis, whatever may be said of the politi-
cal abuse or operating .efficiency of this form of government agency can equally
be said of any device for the administration of public affairs; and what can be
deprecated in the use of the government owned corporation is overcome by the
necessity of rapid and effective performance of distressed periods.
Due to the prevalent use of the corporate device many problems, as yet
unlitigated, will necessarily arise. The earliest indication of this was in the dis-
pute between the Secretary of the Interior and the Comptroller-General when the
latter sought to invalidate the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation as
being a permanent association created, however, under an emergency statute.0 8
Since no court action was taken to settle this controversy, its recurrence is not
unlikely. Corporate structures never before used by federal corporations are
utilized today and the courts may well be faced with the necessity of settling
complicated problems of dividends, voting, management and the interrelation of
parent and subsidiary corporations-particularly where the United States is not
the sole shareholder as in the case of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The guarantee by the United States of corporate obligations, and the default of
securities held by government corporations, with the inevitable result that the
United States will be plunged into an unprecedented proprietorship of private
property, will increase the number of cases that will come before the courts
directly or indirectly involving the corporate device. In addition, many of the
problems usual to other types of administrative bodies, involving decisions made
by the corporation of a quasi-judicial or legislative nature, will be placed before
the courts. Only the broadest prediction can be made as to the final disposition
of such questions. In no case can it be said that the courts will act exclusively
with reference only to the corporate form; the interests of the United States will
weigh heavily in the determination of what precedents and analogies will be used
in rendering individual judgments by way of accretions to a growing body of
new law.
S.E.
THE LAWYER'S EXCLUSIVE PROVINcE-Admission to the bar confers upon
an individual the right of entry into a field of activity, called "the practice of
law", from which all those who are not members of the bar are excluded. The
justification for this monopoly, conditioned upon strict educational and character
requirements and conformance to an abnormally high standard of ethical con-
duct, is the protection of the public against injury which might result were the
territory open to others. The boundaries of this monopoly should therefore be
io6. VAe DORN, Gov RNMTm CORPORATIONS (1926). This book contains an excellent
survey of the wartime government corporations.
107. Rosner, Revive the United States Housing Corporation (1933) 16 WORLD TOMOR-
ROW 445, 446: "Here is a chapter in our history which the 'rugged individualist' would
like us to forget. The story is well worth retelling . . . In seven years the New York
State Housing Board has provided under its jurisdiction homes for igoo families, which is
less than one-third the number built by the United States Housing Corporation in a year."
1O8. 48 STAT. 200, 40 U. S. C. A. § 401 (a) (1933) ; TIME, January 29, 1934, at 14.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
coextensive with the public purpose to be subserved and to the degree that the
public will not be benefited thereby, they must be restricted.' Recent devel-
opments 2 have made clearings in the "wilderness of single instances" which
theretofore were the only guides in determining what activities should con-
stitute the practice of law. Although they afford neither a precise nor final
definition of such practice,3 they serve to make apparent many of the consid-
erations which are persuasive or controlling in ascertaining whether a given
activity lies within the lawyer's exclusive doma;n, and to form a basis for a
more scientific determination of the proper extent of such exclusive ambit of
activity.
In determining whether a given activity constitutes the practice of law,
three elements must be found, the absence of any one being conclusive against
restriction of the activity to members of the bar. These prerequisites are en-
tirely distinct from the requirement, later to be considered, that the activity be
legal in nature.
The first of these is generally considered as settled and obvious: The acts
done must concern the legal relations of others, and not those of the person
engaging in the activity in question.' In this respect, the interest to the public
in having all legal work done by persons skilled in it is outweighed by the force
of a democratic political philosophy which abhors such direct restraint on indi-
vidual liberty, although it finds no objection against restraint upon an individ-
ual's choice of one to act for him.' A person may draw his own will or deed,
or prosecute or defend in court a suit to which he is a party," although he is
i. The contention that the bounds of the lawyer's exclusive domain of activity should
extend beyond the limits of the public's interest in the performance of acts by persons of
professional attainments, so as to afford the lawyer a monopoly which will adequately
compensate him for the long and difficult period of training to which he has been subjected,
does not appear sustainable from a social viewpoint. This view sanctions a subordination
of the public interest to the interests of a restricted class. If society owes the lawyer
opportunities commensurate with the training undergone, they should be afforded by
greater restriction upon admissions to the bar, rather than in the extension of the field of
exclusive activity.
2. For a complete collection of cases, statutes, and statements of principles, and
bibliography on this question see HICKS AND KATZ, UNAUTHORIZED PRAcrIcE oF LAW
(934).
3. The many definitions of the practice of law which have been attempted by the courts
have for the most part been drafted with a view primarily to covering the particular case
being decided. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 286, 288 Pac. 157, 159
(1930) ; cf. Savings Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. x95, 199 (1879) ; li re Duncan, 83 S. C. x86,
i89, 65 S. E. 210, 211 (19o9). A precise definition which may be used as an unvarying
test for solving all problems of encroachment on the lawyer's field of activity has been
considered by some as the ultimate desideratum. See Ashley, The Unauthorized Practice
of Law (93o) 16 A. B. A. J. 558; Weiner, Corporations and the Practice of Law (1932)
4 DAK. L. REV. 59. However, it would seem that any such definition would only be self-
limiting and invite inroads. The goal should be to make clear and emphasize the elements
of policy which make it advisable to restrict a given activity to lawyers.
4. Though it may well be that "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client", the
principle is universal that one may act in regard to his own legal interests.
5. It has been argued that there is no justification for compelling a person to employ a
lawyer to act for him in regard to legal matters:
"The average man today knows the difference between a lawyer and one who is
not, just as he does between a doctor and one who is not, and he takes his chances
when he does without the lawyer or the doctor, but he is entitled to. He resents
compulsion to employ either. What society owes him is that the person carrying the
diploma of either profession shall have the training and character and ability that he is
entitled to expect when he employs him." Kelsey, Encroachments by Corporations on
Private Practice, LECrUREs ON LEGAL Topics (before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of N. Y., 1924) 5.
However, the law has not acceded to such view.
6. It is a settled rule that a party to an action may appear in propria persona. Arthaud
v. Griffin, 2o2 Iowa 462, 210 N. W. 540 (1926) ; I THORNTON, ATTORmys AT LAW 27 (94).
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not an attorney. Likewise he may sue on an obligation the interest in which
he has obtained by an assignment.7 However, where the assignment has been
made for the purpose of collection, the assignor retaining the right to the pro-
ceeds collected, the assignee in collecting such claim acts as an attorney, and if
he is a layman, cannot bring suit on it.8
A corporation, not being able to act personally, must act in legal matters
through an attorney 9 and no layman will be permitted to prosecute or defend
a suit involving the corporation's interests, even though such layman happens
to be an official 10 or even the sole shareholder. 1 But although a corporation
may through its lawyer protect its own legal interests, it cannot, even though
it employs an attorney at law to do the actual work, act in respect to legal rela-
tions of others and if it does so it encroaches upon the province of the lawyer .
2
Similarly, a voluntary association may employ an attorney in regard to legal
interests of the membership as a whole, although it may not do so to protect
the interests of the individual members. 13
The fact that a layman does not have the sole interest in a legal matter
does not prevent him from acting personally with regard to the interests which
he holds in common with others.'4 A guarantor of an obligation on which there
has been a default, and an insurer who must pay the amount of any judgment
within the limits of the policy, have personal interests in a claim which entitle
them to act in respect to it, not as attorneys but in their own right.' 5 Where,
however, the policy 16 does not provide for liability of the insurer for any part
See Hightower v. Hawthorn, Fed. Cas. No. 6478b, at 142 (Ark. Terr. 1826). It is
immaterial that he is a suspended attorney. Matter of Secured Holdings Corp., 88 Misc.
7o6, I5I N. Y. Supp. 422 (Sup. Ct. 1915). But once a party has appeared in court through
an attorney, the court will not recognize him as a proper party to conduct any phase of the
case as long as the retainer continues. Toy v. Haskell, 128 Cal. 558, 61 Pac. 89 (igoo) (stip-
ulations and notices signed by party who had appeared by attorney disregarded). Halsey v.
Carter, 29 N. Y. Super. Ct. 535 (1866).
7. Philbrook v. Superior Court, ii Cal. 31, 43 Pac. 302 (1896).
8. State v. James Sanford Agency, 69 S. W. (2d) 895 (Tenn. 1934) (collection agency
receiving assignment of claims and agreeing to return proceeds collected less a fee of 5o%
if suit was brought held acting in respect to the assignor's rights and guilty of practicing
law by bringing suit on the claim). In Cohn v. Thompson, 128 Cal. App. 783, 36 P. (2d)
364 (1932) such a transaction was said to vest sufficient interest in the assignee to permit
it to sue on the claim through its attorney without thereby practicing law, but the existence
of a statute permitting collection agencies to recover on claims by suit makes the force of
this language doubtful. See also Koepple v. Morrison, 84 Cal. App. 137, 257 Pac. 590
(1927).
9. Nispel v. Western Union R. R., 64 Ill. 313 (1872) (plea by corporation "in its own
person" held defective); see State Bank of Indiana v. Bell, 5 Blackf. 127 (Ind. 1839);
Union Pac. R. R. v. Homey, s Kan. 340 (1870).
io. Bennie v Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac. 738 (1923); Nixon, Ellison &
Co. v. Southwestern Ins. Co., 47 Ill. 144 (1868). VA. CODE A zN. (Michie, I93o) § 3426a,
permits a corporation to appear in court through an agent or employee who is regularly
employed on a salary basis.
ii. Cary & Co. v. F. E. Satterlee & Co., I66 Minn. 5o7, 2o8 N. W. 4o8 (I9z6).
12. On the inability of a corporation to "practice law" see infra notes 47, 48, 49.
13. But cf. Irving v. Neal, 2o9 Fed. 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1913) where an anti-boycott
association provided a lawyer and paid costs in an action brought by employers against a
trade union which apparently involved rights for the protection of which the association
was formed, and such action was upheld. Statutes in some states provide that corporations
or voluntary associations may provide legal services through lawyers to their employees.
MAss. GEN. LAWS I932, c. 221 § 47; MicH. Com'ip. LAws (1929) § 10175.
14. Copeland v. Dabbs, 22i Ala. 489, 129 So. 88 (1930) (part owner permitted to pre-
pare conveyance of the joint property and secure signatures of other owners to it although
he was not an attorney).
I5. In re Kelsey, i86 App. Div. 95, 173 N. Y. Supp. 86o (2d Dep't i939) (company
guaranteeing payment of mortgages could properly employ attorneys to foreclose them).
16. A familiar type of such policy provides for defense of malpractice suits brought
against physicians.
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of the judgment, it has been held that an insurer is illegally practicing law when
it defends suits under such policy through its own lawyers.17  But under the
principle stated above, an opposite result would seem to be necessary if the lia-
bility of the insurer, though not to the full extent of the judgment, is for some
part of it. This situation has been viewed with alarm by many who point out
that all legal business could be assumed by insurance companies by drafting
policies providing for defense by the insurer of all suits that might be brought
against the insured, and restricting the insurer's liability to a minimum sum,
regardless of the amount of any judgment recovered.' s Although the insurer
would in such case have an interest in conducting the litigation to avoid pay-
ment of the minimum amount stated in the policy, it seems probable that the
courts when presented with the situation, would recognize this as a mere sub-
terfuge, even though to this extent they must abandon the principle that one
acting solely or concurrently for his own interests is not acting as an attorney.
A second factor which has been treated by the courts as a requisite to the
practice of law is that the legal activity be rendered for a compensation or re-
ward.19 Such benefit from the legal work should be carefully distinguished
from an interest in the outcome of the legal activity which is referred to in the
preceding paragraph. It is a benefit derived from the activity as an activity,
not as changing or preserving certain legal relations. The compensation may
be present or prospective, direct or indirect. The test thus laid down is obvi-
ously elastic and its application must be a matter of policy. The reasons for
requiring profit to be made from legal activity before punishing a layman for
engaging in it are that where no compensation is given for legal work, the activ-
ity will not tend to reach business proportions, and, where the person who
actually does the legal work is not a lawyer, the person receiving its benefits is
unlikely to rely upon the existence of special qualifications in the actor. There-
fore any benefit to the layman which tends to make the regular rendition of
legal services good business policy for the actor 20 should be sufficient to satisfy
the compensation requisite. Thus where a collection agency forwards claims
upon which suit is required to a lawyer, and makes no additional profit on the
transaction with the lawyer, it is apparent that the agency has benefited since it
has satisfied a customer and increased its good will in respect to its non-legal
activities. The benefit to a trust company from drawing a will without charge
for a customer is likewise easily detectable. It would seem clear that a news-
paper that publishes answers to legal queries without charge to the inquirer is
indirectly profiting in the form of a probability of increased circulation.
2 1
17. State ex rel. Physicians' Defense v. Laylin, 73 Ohio 9o, 76 N. E. 567 (19o).
Statutes prohibiting lay practice of law in a number of states exempt insurance companies
from their operation. ILL. Rav. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32, §228; MASS. GEN. LAWS
(932) C. 221, § 47; MINN. STAT. (Mason Supp. 1934) c. 114, § 5687-1 (c); N. C. CODE
ANN. (ig3i) § 'g (b) ; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 401, § 6238. It is doubtful, however,
whether the effect of such statutes is to permit insurance companies to do acts which the
courts consider as practicing law.
18. See Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession (1913) 2"2 YAI L. J. 59o, 593;
Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies (931) 41 YALE L. J.
69, 93.
1g. State v. Adair, 156 Atl. 358 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1922) ; Fichette v. Taylor, 254 N. W.
gio (Minn. 1934); see Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401 (1932); cf.
McCargo v. State, I So. 161 (Miss. 1887). Statutes in a large number of the states make
the payment of compensation a necessary element in the practice of law in general; others
exempt non-profit corporations from prohibitions against lay practice of law. See HicKs
AXND KATz, op. cit. supra note 2.
2o. If a business man should give legal aid to his customers with a view to increasing
their patronage, and not merely out of a feeling of generosity, it would seem that he would
act for contemplated compensation in the form of business profits.
21. Several statutes permit such publication of answers to legal inquiries as an excep-
tion to the prohibition against lay practice. MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 221, § 47; MINN.
STAT. (Mason Supp. 1934) § 5687-1 (c) (provided the name of the lawyer is not disclosed
and no additional charge is made for the service).
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Where the legal activity is carried on by a "non-profit" association, the
courts are nevertheless unwilling to assume that no profit is derived from the
legal activity,"2 and some have gone so far as to declare that profit to the lay
actor is not a necessary element to punishment for engaging in legal work for
others.2 3 Although in all such cases it appears that some form of profit is made
by the corporation on the legal activity itself, even though the business as a
whole does not show a surplus, the language of the courts indicates that they
would not hesitate to outlaw any practice of offering legal services to the public
which they considered' obnoxious, 2 4 even though profit was derived from neither
the legal services themselves nor the lay activities of the corporation. In this
situation the existence of evils independent of any profit element justifies dis-
pensing with it.
A third element which has been considered by the courts as a sine qua non
of practicing law is habituality.25 The basis for the rule is apparent: that
any injury to society from single occasions of legal activity by laymen will be
slight and there is no need for prophylactic or punitive measures .2  Where a
22. In Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 N. P. (N. s.) 1I5'(Ohio
I930), a "non-profit" corporation advertising and rendering legal services to its members
was held guilty of practicing law. The corporation had made a profit as a result of its
business but no evidence of its disposition was presented. The court, in overruling the
contention that such practice was lawful because the statute prohibiting corporations from
practicing law did not relate to corporations organized not for profit, said: "Under what
conceivable conditions or circumstances would a band of men or women associate them-
selves together into a corporation not for profit for the purposes of practicing law?"
23. People v. Motorists' Ass'n of Ill., 354 Ill. 595, r88 N. E. 827 (1933) ; Goodman v.
Cincinnati Automobile Club, 4 Ohio Bar Rep. 257 (C. P. Ohio, 1931). In People v. Ass'n of
Real Est. Taxpayers of Ill., 354 Ill. Io, 187 N. E. 823 (1933), a non-profit corporation
which advertised that it employed attorneys to bring suits for its members for the purpose
of protecting their property from tax sale or forfeiture pending determination of the
validity of tax assessments on the property was held guilty of practicing law. The
attorneys' fees paid by the corporation were $55,ooo less than the cost to an individual
litigant would have been, and thus it clearly appeared that a saving to the corporation from
the legal activities was effected.
24. The underlying factors which make the offering of legal services by a lay agency
undesirable are treated infra p. 363.
25. People v. Goldsmith, 249 N. Y. 586, 164 N. E. 593 (1928), reVg 224 App. Div. 707,
229 N. Y. Supp. 896 (Ist Dep't 1928) ; People v. Weil, 237 App. Div. 118, 26o N. Y. Supp.
658 (Ist Dep't i93z) ; see McCargo v. State, i So. 161 (Miss. 1887) ; State v. Bryan, 98
N. C. 644, 647, 4 S. E. 522, 523 (x887); cf. People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227
N. Y. 366, 380, 125 N. E. 666, 671 (1919). Contra: In re Duncan, 83 S. C. z86, 65 S. E.
210 (199o) (defendant held guilty of practicing law for seeking release of a prisoner by
interviewing magistrate in absence of evidence of any such prior activity). In cases involv-
ing participation by a layman in a single suit, though the actor is not thereby rendered
punishable for practicing law, pleadings and other acts done by him in connection with the
suit will not be considered effective, although in all other situations where acts are wrong-
fully done by a layman legal recognition will be given to them (e. g., a deed drawn by a
layman for another will not therefore be considered void), aside from the question of
whether the activity is punishable as being a practice of law. Weir v. Slocum, 3 How.
Prac. 397 (N. Y. 1848) (summons and complaint signed by layman held invalid); Ellis
v. Bingham County, 7 Idaho 86, 6o Pac. 79 (igoo); Leaver v. Kilmer, 54 Atl. 817 (N. J.
i9o3) (briefs submitted by laymen ignored). A judgment obtained by a defendant who
was represented by a layman was held void in Kaplan v. Berman, 37 Misc. 502, 75 N. Y.
Supp. loo2 (Sup. Ct. ion). Contra: Rader v. Snyder, 3 W. Va. 413 (869).
26. The question of whether a given activity constitutes the practice of law arises
where a layman is indicted for contempt or for violating a specific statutory provision
prohibiting lay practice of law: People v. Motorists' Ass'n of Ill., 354 Ill. 595, i88 N. E.
827 (1933); State v. James Sanford Agency, 64 S. W. (2d) 895 (Tenn. 1934); where
quo warranto proceedings are brought against a corporation: Berk v. State, 225 Ala. 324,
142 So. 832 (1932) ; State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 1O5 Wash. iz,
177 Pac. 694 (iig) ; cf. Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932) (corporation
seeking permission of court to engage in questioned activity); Re Cooperative Law Co.,
198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 16 (i9io) ; where an injunction is sought: Dworken v. Apartment
House Owner's Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 215, 176 N. E. 577 (i3i); where an attorney is
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layman has been discovered engaging in a legal activity only once, but under
circumstances which indicate that the practice was habitual, the requirements
of this rule are properly satisfied.
2 7
On numerous occasions the dogma has been voiced by the courts that
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer or as being competent to render
legal services, is the practice of law. However, in nearly all the cases in which
an activity of a layman has been condemned as amounting to a "holding out"
as an attorney, such activity included the giving of legal advice, drawing legal
documents, handling cases in court, or a combination of such services 2s which
are themselves the practice of law and therefore the element of representation
to the public of professional competency was not a necessary element in the
decisions. Nevertheless, where no acts of a legal character are done and the
only benefit to the layman by such misrepresentation is an aid to his lay activ-
ities which might come from reliance by the public upon personal fitness, it
would seem that an injury results which should be punishable. In such case
none of the requisites of practicing law are present but there is nevertheless an
encroachment upon privileges of the lawyer which should in all justice to the
lawyer, and, less directly, to the public itself which is interested in the main-
tenance of a bona fide bar, be treated as an offense against the administration
of justice and punishable as such.29
Having determined the existence of an activity involving interests of others
which is done repeatedly for a profit, the further problem arises whether
such activity involves legal matters which laymen should not be permitted to
handle. It is apparent that not all activity that has for its purpose the effecting
of a change in or preserving the existing legal relations of another is legal activ-
ity. Commercial agents do such work regularly without any question of en-
croachment upon the legal profession being involved. 30 The lawyer has tradi-
sought to be punished for helping a layman practice law: Townsend v. State, 210 Cal. 362, 291
Pac. 837 (i93o) ; In re Pace, 17o App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. Supp. 641 (ist Dep't 1915) ;
or where the suit is for the consideration bargained for as the price of the questioned
activity: Johnson v. Davidson, 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 Pac. 159 (I92I); Public Service
Traffic Bureau, Inc. v. Haworth Marble Co., 40 Ohio App. 255 (g3i) ; Ferris v. Snively,
i72 Wash. 167, i9 P. (2d) 942 (933). In the last situation, although the layman cannot
recover from the customer, it has been held that a lay clerk who did acts of a legal nature
for clients of an attorney could recover the value of such services from the attorney. Ferris
v. Snively, supra; cf. Johnson v. Davidson, supra. The manner in which the question of
whether a given activity may properly be performed only by lawyers comes before the
courts does not, however, appear to affect the determination of that question.
27. See People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 67, (I919) (layman who advertised
that he offered "Redaction of all Legal Papers" held guilty of practicing law though
evidence of only one instance of having drawn documents was present).
28. In re Eastern Idaho Loaf & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 28o, 288 Pac. I57 (i93o) ; People
v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345, 95 N. E. I89 (I9ii); People v. Hubbard, 313 Ill. 346, 245 N. E.
93 (1924) ; Commonwealth v. Grant, 2oi Mass. 458, 87 N. E. 895 (igog) ; In re Bailey, 50
Mont. 365, 146 Pac. IOI (I915). But cf. People v. Taylor, 56 Colo. 442, 138 Pac. 762
(94) ; State v. Rosborough, 152 La. 945, 94 So. 858 (I922).
29. Many statutes contain prohibitions against laymen holding themselves out as
lawyers, but although their language is unqualified, they seem to relate to cases where the
holding out is made effective by rendition of legal services. See HIcKS AND KATZ, op. cit.
supra note 2. In Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Credit and Adjustment Co., 4 Ohio Bar
Rep. 239 (C. P. 1931), the sending of dunning letters threatening suit if the debts were not
paid was held illegal.
3o. The function of a salesman to effectuate transfers in legal title to goods and to
create new contract rights and obligations, or of a fiduciary to handle a trust estate,
involves the change of legal relations of -0thers but is of a nature which does not make
essential knowledge or training in the law. Likewise the collection of contract claims is
not alone considered as involving sufficient necessity for knowledge of legal principles to
restrict such activities to lawyers. Kendrick v. State, 218 Ala. 277, 120 So. 142 (2928);
see In re Associated Lawyers Co., 134 App. Div. 350, II9 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Ist Dep't i9o9).
But see Meisel v. Nat'l Jewelers' Board of Trade, 9o Misc. i9, 28, 152 N. Y. Supp. 913,
917 (Sup. Ct. i9is). The adjustment and collection of tort claims has also not been
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tionally served as advocate, counsellor, drafter of documents pertaining to legal
rights, fiduciary, commercial agent, and in other capacities. In some of these
characters he acts in a field open equally to laymen; in others he has to some
extent acquired exclusive privileges.
The lawyer is popularly considered as having exclusive privileges primarily
when he acts in the capacity of an advocate for another before a judicial body.
Such exclusive privilege is well established where the advocatory activity is in
a court of record,31 since in those forums such function is considered as an
essential element in the administration of justice, requiring legal training and
skill and special honesty and trustworthiness which laymen in general do not
possess. However, before other bodies which perform functions of a judicial
nature, a layman is permitted to represent interests of others where the nature
of the advocacy is considered as not demanding legal knowledge or training.
Thus it is held that one who is not a member of the bar may represent others
in judicial matters before the lower judiciary 32 and before administrative
boards. 3  The test used, although sometimes not soundly applied,3 4 is a proper
one and shows a recognition of the reason behind exclusion of laymen from any
activity.
In the relations of advisor and of drafter of documents pertaining to legal
relations, the reason for a trained and regulated bar requires that the lawyer
have a strictly exclusive field. Knowledge of the law and a higher trustworthi-
ness are imperative where one receives information concerning the personal or
property interests of another and purports to give opinions or advice or draw
documents pertaining to the legal position of the other which often result in an
irrevocable change of vital interests. Serious injuries may result from the vio-
lation of the lawyer's duties not to disclose or use for personal advantage con-
fidential information, received for the purpose of performing legal services. In
treated as an activity within the lawyer's exclusive province even though just settlement
of such claims is readily seen to involve thorough knowledge of tort law and an application
of such law to the facts out of which the claim arose. One recent case, however, has
enjoined such practice by laymen as being an unlawful practice of law. Fichette v. Taylor,
254 N. W. gio (Minn. 1934).
31. In re Pierre Spicer, i Tuck. 8o (N. Y. Surr. 1869) (acting as special guardian in pro-
bate proceedings); Harkins v. Murphy & Bolanz, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 568, 112 S. W. 336
(19o8).
32. Laymen are generally permitted to appear in a representative capacity in justices'
courts since the matters are small and generally do not involve technical legal rules. Hall v.
Sawyer, 47 Barb. II6 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1866) ; see Porter v. Bronson, 29 How. Prac. 292
(N. Y. 1865) (layman permitted to practice before the Marine Court, a court not of record).
33. Laymen are usually permitted to practice before administrative bodies with the
consent of the particular board. See In re Gibbs, 35 Ariz. 346, 278 Pac. 371 (3929) (before
U. S. Land Ct.); Mulligan v. Smith, 32 Colo. 404, 76 Pac. IO63 (1904); Public
Service Traffic Bureau, Inc. v. Haworth Marble Co., 40 Ohio App. 255 (193r) (before
I. C. C.); 6 STAT. 200 (I870), 35 U. S. C. A. § iI (3929) (before Commissioner of
Patents); 23 STAT. 258 (z884), 5 U. S. C. A. § 26 (1927) (before Treas. Dep't of U. S.) ;
Croker Nat'l Fire Prevention Co. v. Harlem, etc. Works. 132 Misc. 687, 23o N. Y. Supp.
67o (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1927) (appeal from Fire Dep't to Board of Standards & Appeal).
But cf. Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836 (1893). A layman has been per-
mitted to act to secure reduction of another's taxes before tax commissioners. Dunlap v.
Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 S. W. 441 (igoi) ; Tanenbaum v. Higgins, igo App. Div. 86I, i8O
N. Y. Supp. 738 (ist Dep't i92o). But cf. People v. Purdy, 174 App. Div. 694, 362 N. Y.
Supp. 7o (Ist Dep't 1916). Proceedings and presentation of claims before referee in
bankruptcy can be engaged in only by a lawyer. In re Ploof, 243 Fed. 423 (D. Fla. 1916) ;
In re Looney, 262 Fed. 2o9 (D. Tex. 192o) ; In re Scott, 53 F. (2d) 89 (S. D. Mich.
i93z). Attachment proceedings are of a legal character and can be conducted only by
lawyers. Black & White Operating Co. v. Grosbart, io7 N. J. L. 63, 151 Atl. 630 (1930).
Conducting distraint proceedings has been said to be an improper activity for laymen.
Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., 134 N. J. Eq. 68, 368 Atl. 229 (i933).
34. Much criticism has been directed against permitting certified public accountants to
practice before the Board of Tax Appeals, it being pointed out that the nature of the Board
requires the highest type of legal knowledge and training. 57 A. B. A. REP. 57 (932).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the lawyer, the performance of these duties is assured by modes of enforcement
to which laymen are not amenable. It is therefore uniformly held that only an
attorney at law who stands in a relation of direct personal responsibility to the
person for whom the services are rendered may draft documents 35 or give ad-
vice 1 concerning the existence, preservation or change of legal relations.
Where, however, advice is given, or documents drawn by a layman concerning
legal matters which are purely incidental to his business, and not as independent
legal service which is considered as the principal element in the transaction, the
courts will not consider this practice of law if a conflict of the interests of the
recipient and the donor which threatens serious consequences is not present.
This is because a degree of skill in the slight legal service rendered is acquired
by the donor in the course of his business and generally, even though a conflict
of interests between donor and recipient may exist because the donor has the
interests of his business foremost, little harm to society can result by extending
the incidental legal services, since the recipient does not rely upon the absence
of any self interest in the donor. Thus a company which searches and insures
titles is primarily rendering a non-legal insurance service and is n6t practicing
law 8 7 even though the effect of the policy is incidentally to advise the policy-
holder that in the opinion of the insurer the title is good. But when a title
insurance company or a real estate broker draws deeds or mortgages to prop-
erty which it has insured or sold, the legal activity of drawing the documents
has been treated as distinct from the non-legal insurance or brokerage element
and not a proper lay activity.38 An opposite result, however, obtains in some
jurisdictions which treat such conveyancing as incidental to the legitimate lay
business and do not require the existence of independent legally trained per-
sons.89 These latter states are apparently little impressed by the argument that
the interests of the one drawing the instrument and of each of the two parties
to the conveyance are necessarily not in harmony.
40
The rendering of information and assistance as to legal matters to lawyers
by lay persons or agencies has been legalized by statute in several states, where
the lawyer receiving the services maintains full professional responsibility to
35. In re Flynn's Estate, 253 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Surr. 1931) (will) ; People v. Alfani,
227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671 (igig) (bill of sale and chattel mortgage) ; Rader v. Snyder,
3 W. Va. 413 (1869) (pleadings) ; Childs v. Smeltzer, 17I Atl. 883 (Pa. 1934) ; Paul v.
Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 4o1 (1932) (conveyancing in general) ; see Gauler v.
Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co., 9 Pa. C. C. 634, 635 (1891); People v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. goi, 9o8 (ig3i). But cf. State v. Retail Credit
Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S. W. (2d) 918 (i931) (layman permitted to draw
abstracts of title). The preparation of articles of incorporation and other documents in
connection with the organizing of a corporation has been held to require legal knowledge
and a proper activity for only independent lawyers. But N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 193o)
§ 52-214t excepts such activity from those prohibited to laymen.
36. People v. Merchant's Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (922); see
Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); Miller v. St. Louis Trust Co., 74
S. W. (2d) 348 (Mo. 1934); In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15
(Ig91) ; Grocers' and Merchants' Bureau v. Gray, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 87 (1916). But it
has been held that advising a corporation how it might reduce its franchise taxes was not
an improper activity for an accountant. Elfenbein v. Luckenbach Terminals, iii N. J. L. 67,166 Atl. 91 (1933).
37. Gambrell, Lay Encroachments on the Legal Profession. (1931) 29 MIcH. L. REv.
989, 995. Statutes in Ark., Ga., La., Md., Mass., Mich., R. I., and W. Va. specifically
except title companies from the operation of the provisions prohibiting the lay practice
of law.
38. Gauler v. Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co., 9 Pa. C. C. 634, 635 (89).
39. N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 41, § 27Ia; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1930)
§ 52-214t. See People v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919).
Although the wording of the statutes referred to in footnote 36 is broad, it will probably
not be held to permit conveyancing by title companies.
40. See Gambrell, loc. cit. supra note 37.
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his clients for the services rendered.4' Although such statutes have not yet
been judicially construed, it seems doubtful that the courts will permit the lay
rendition of services in matters which are more than merely mechanical or cler-
ical and which require legal training and judgment in their preparation since
it clearly appears unwholesome to sanction the rubber-stamping by attorneys
of briefs and legal documents which are the products of legal work by laymen.
The problem of most difficulty and moment in connection with encroach-
ments upon the lawyer's exclusive field of activity arises where the actual legal
work is done by an attorney employed by a lay intermediary, most usually a
corporation, which itself, rather than the lawyer, deals with the person whose
legal relations are involved. The client receives legal services rendered by one
who is learned in the law and who is under the strict regulations of his pro-
fession as regards his conduct towards the client. But the problem in this con-
nection arises from the fact that the lay intermediary, rather than the ultimate
beneficiary of the services, occupies the position of client. In many types of
cases it is clear that protection of the customer demands more than merely that
the acts pertaining to his legal relations be done by one skilled in the law. This
is apparent when the interests of the intermediary and those of the customer
are conflicting. The interest of a trust company in being appointed trustee
under a will which it seeks to have its salaried attorney draw is universally con-
sidered so inconsistent with proper protection of the interests of the testator
as to make such conduct a wrongful practice of law by the trust company.42
Where a collection agency, through its attorney, undertakes to bring suit on a
claim submitted for collection, its interests and those of the customer may part
and even become antagonistic, and the courts hold that the customer is being
deprived of the direct allegiance of the attorney, a deprivation which on the whole
involves such serious consequences that the practical economies of permittilng
suit to be brought by the agency's attorney are outweighed. 43  The same rea-
soning has been applied where legal services are rendered by automobile clubs, 4
protective associations, 45 and law firms containing lay members.
46
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. (Castle Supp. 193) §5964; Ga. Laws i931, no. 363; ILL. REv.
STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32, §:278; MICH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § IOI75; N. J. ComP. STAT.
(Supp. 1930) § 52-214t; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 280.
42. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (i93o) ; People
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 9oi (1931) ; Miller v. St. Louis
Trust Co., 74 S. W. (2d) 348 (Mo. 1934); People v. People's Trust Co., i8o App. Div.
494, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't 1917). Agreements have been drawn up between
associations of trust companies and bar associations in many states which provide for
elimination of encroaching activities. See HicxS AND KATz, op. cit. supra note 2, 122;
Jackson, Corporations and Practice of Law (I93I) 65 U. S. L. REv. I94; (i93o) I6 A. B.
A. J. 344, 549.
43. Collection of claims by suit has been held to constitute the practice of law and
wrongful if done by one other than a lawyer of the owner of the claim. Berk v. State, 225
Ala. 324, 342 So. 832 (1932) ; Buxton v. Lietz, 136 N. Y. Supp. 829 (N. Y. Mun. Ct.
1912) ; In re Newman, 172 App. Div. 173, i58 N. Y. Supp. 375 (ist Dep't 1916) ; Grocers'
& Merchants' Bureau v. Gray, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 87 (1916); State v. James Sanford
Agency, 69 S. W. (2d) 895 (Tenn. 1934); see Midland Credit Adjustment Corp. v.
Donnelly, 219 Ill. App. 271 (1920).
44. People v. Motorists' Ass'n of Ill., 354 Ill. 595, 188 N. E. 827 (i933); Goodman v.
Cincinnati Automobile Club, 4 Ohio Bar Rep. '257 (C. P. Ohio, i93I) ; cf. Allin v. Motorist's
Alliance, 234 Ky. 714, 29 S. W. (2d) i9 (193o).
45. People v. Cal. Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354 (I926) ; People v. Ass'n of Real
Estate Taxpayers of Ill., 354 Ill. io2, 187 N. E. 823 (1933); Creditors' Nat'l Clearing
House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886 (917); Unger v. Landlords' Manage-
ment Corp., iI4 N. J. Eq. 68, i68 Ati. 229 (1933).
46. Hitson v. Browne, 3 Colo. 304 (3877) ; cf. Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78, 24 Pac. 846
(i8go); Langdon v. Condon, 67 Neb. 243, 93 N. W. 388 (I9O3); see COHEn, THE LAW:
BUSINESS OR PRoFEssIoN (1924) 217; Whelan v. Bailey, 36 P. (2d) 709 (Cal. App., 1934)
(requirement that public administrator employ county attorney and pay him fees which
would go into county treasury held invalid as the practice of law by the county).
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Since in these last cases the probability of any conflict of interests is slight,
it would seem that the absence of individual allegiance to the client is not the
sole consideration which moves the courts to adhere to the dogmas that "a cor-
poration cannot practice law" and "a lay intermediary cannot profit from the
rendition of legal services".17  A lawyer is under restrictions against solicitation
and advertising that are based on sound principles of protection of the public
by making the basis of selection of an attorney earned reputation for ability and
fidelity rather than self-laudation and skillful publicity,48 whereas no such regu-
lations are imposed on lay intermediaries. To permit such intermediary to offer
legal services to the public would, because of the discrepancy in advertising
privileges, give it and its attorneys an advantage over independent attorneys and
would take away from the latter business which, given equal solicitation priv-
ileges, they might have acquired by virtue of their undivided allegiance to the
client and personal professional reputation. This is a strong consideration,
though seldom expressed in the decisions.
It has been urged that there is no inherent reason why corporations which
may act as fiduciaries, render medical and architectural services, and be pun-
ished for crime, cannot provide legal services, and that in many cases great
public economies would result from group handling of legal business.49 Where
members of a beneficial association or automobile club receive as a partial return
for their membership fee any necessary legal advice or services that might be
needed in the event that they are prosecuted civilly or criminally, a definite
social gain would seem to result from such legal insurance. The same might
be said of the collection agency cases. But the courts are unwilling to weigh
the possible economies under such a system against the social injury which might
result from the existence of a bar dependent upon lay organizations. It is feared
that under present conditions a concession as to an activity which appears to
have a minimum of social danger would invite immediate abuse by methods
which while adhering to the form of the permitted activity would nevertheless
accomplish undesirable results. It may be possible, however, to obtain the econ-
omies offered by group legal services, without losing the advantages that exclu-
sive professional activity affords. It has been suggested that this could be
accomplished by imposing upon such lay intermediaries the attorney's high stand-
ards of duty and responsibility, and the same restrictions against advertising and
solicitation of legal business which apply to lawyers, adherence to such regu-
lations being assured by financial security and responsibility, the only possible
substitute for the character security of the lawyer.50  But such expedients per-
mit most of the difficulties to remain. The impersonal financial responsibility
of the corporation does not seem to be a sufficient guarantee against subordi-
nation of the customer's interests to its own when these interests conflict; it is
not a satisfactory substitute for the direct allegiance and strict personal respon-
47. See Boston, I LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics, op. Cit. supra note 5, at 549. Corpora-
tions have not been permitted to engage in a general law business. People v. Merchants'
Management Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 2o9 Pac. 363 (x922); Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511,
162 S. E. 796 (1932) ; Matter of Co-operative Law Co., I98 N. Y. 47g, 92 N. E. I5 (igio);
State v. Merchants' Protective Corp., IO5 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1912).
48. See In re Gray, 184 App. Div. 822, I72 N. Y. Supp. 648 (ist Dep't i918) ; Ingersoll
v. Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 311, 98 S. W. 178, i9o (i9o6); Canons of Professional Ethics
no. 27 (1928) 53 A. B. A. Rep. 776; Gambrell, mupra note 37, at 995.
49. Dawson, Frankenstein, Inc. (I93O) I9 AsIER. MERCURY 274; WORMSER, FRANICEN-
STEIN, INCORPORATED (1931) i6i; Note (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1114. Provided that the
actual work is done by duly licensed persons, corporations have been permitted to offer
various professional services. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103
N. W. IO78 (IO5) (Medicine); Scadron's Sons Inc. v. Susskind, 132 Misc. 406, 229
N. Y. Supp. 209 (1928) (Optometry); People v. Rodgers Co., 277 Ill. 151, 115 N. E. 146
(1917) (Architecture).
5o. Note (93) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1114, 1i8.
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sibility of the ethically trained and qualified lawyer. Moreover, to the extent
that the restrictions on advertising and solicitation result in failing to apprise
the public of the legal services rendered, the benefits of permitting lay agencies
to perform them would be greatly diminished; and to the extent that solicitation
of lay business (to which no objection could be made) results in effective
indirect solicitation of legal business, it would again give the intermediary an
advantage over the independent lawyer.
A plan which appears to afford a maximum of social utility with a mini-
mum of practical difficulties would be to permit lay organizations to advertise
that they will, as part of the return for the membership fee, bear the cost of
certain legal activities when they become necessary up to a stated maximum,"'
such activities to be performed by an attorney who is not employed by the in-
termediary and who does not in any way split fees with it. The selection of the
attorney would be made by the customer.5 2 Compliance with these regulations
could be effectively compelled by punishing both the intermediary and the law-
yer involved in any violation, such as suggesting to the customer an attorney
who has a financial interest in or arrangement with the organization. Under
the plan outlined, all the actual legal work would be done by professionally trained
and responsible lawyers who, though their fees would be paid by the interme-
diary, would stand in a direct attorney-client relationship with the customer and
be under neither duty nor temptation to put the interests of the intermediary
above those of the customer. The intermediary in advertising that it will ren-
der legal services will not be soliciting legal business for individual lawyers,
but will serve the useful function of providing legal insurance and a complete
service, including both legal and nonlegal acts. Even though the intermediary
might not make any profit from the legal activities as such since the lawyers
would charge the usual fees, the greater value to the public of the combined
service, lay and legal, would make such practice profitable. If these functions
are not of real value to the public, the charge imposed because of them will, in
the course of business competition, cause them to be eliminated. It would then
be apparent that the past success of many of these organizations is the result
of exploitation for their own benefit of the lawyer's professional attributes,
and that the services of the independent lawyer are not inadequate to supply the
needs of the community. L.H.
INTERESTS IN AN UNPATENTED INVENTION-Though the bulging files of
the Patent Office may seem to indicate that no man in this country conceives
an invention without at once invoking the protection of the government, cases
are far from infrequent where litigation has followed the failure to patent.
Often an inventor, wary of the disclosure required for securing a patent, pre-
fers to rely upon simple secrecy rather than upon the complicated protective
devices of Congress. But having thus spurned the legislative arm, he flees to
the judicial one when his armor of silence is finally pierced. He contends that
his "interests" have been infringed, that his "rights" have been violated. And
it is then that the courts are called upon to say whether there exist any rights
51. For the further protection of the intermediary against selection by customers of
the highest priced attorneys, it could provide that the attorney's fee in any single action be
limited to a stated percentage of the damages claimed. Both the intermediary and the
customer could, of course, question the reasonableness of the attorney's fees. Additional
administrative details could be worked out as the practical necessities required.
52. Compare the method of selecting attorneys to draw wills provided for in the agree-
ment of the Chicago Fiduciaries Ass'n. Jackson, supra note 41, at T98; Hicics & KATz, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 135.
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or interests in an invention conceived but unpatented; and if they exist, to de-
fine their extent.
In such cases, some courts have replied with simplicity and summariness.
Called upon to define the legal results of a specific situation, they have coupled
with the refusal of a legal remedy to X, the categorical statement that there is
no right of "property" in an unpatented invention. Thius a refusal of injunctive
relief has been accompanied by the gratuitous addendum suggested, plus a note
that the only transferable right in an unpatented invention is the "inchoate
right" to a patent thereon.1 So the United States Supreme Court, stating that
a patent creates a right of property, once indicated that no such right (whatever
it may be) can exist prior to acquisition of a patent.2 The Supreme Court later
held that for jurisdictional purposes an invention cannot be regarded as prop-
erty or a right of property having an actual value susceptible of estimation in
money; but in this case, more warily, the Court refrained from denying that it
may be "property" for other purposes.'
Unquestionably the latter attitude is preferable. The term "property" is
a highly generic one, embracing a vast number of legal consequences attendant
upon an equally large number of fact situations and their variants. When used
unqualifiedly, the term doubtless implies a certain, presumably complete, set of
"normal" legal incidents. Yet certain factual relations may give rise to some
of the legal conclusions normally associated with a "property right", and not
others. When the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, for example, stated that a
mere invention was not property as defined by the constitution of that state, it
had scarcely made any progress toward formulating the precise legal rights of
the plaintiff. However, when the court held that it would be protected from
disclosure by fraud or breach of contract,4 it succeeded in attaching a definite
set of legal consequences to a given set of operative facts; though the meaning-
less question as to whether this result constituted the recognition of a "prop-
erty right", remained unanswered.5
It is evident then that, whatever the reasons they have assigned, courts
have generally held that an inventor is possessed of certain rights, privileges
and powers in respect to his unpatented product, and is subject to certain lia-
bilities in respect thereof. His rights and the correlative duties of others have
received recognition in courts of law and of equity. Given certain sets of facts
an inventor can, with reasonable assurance of success, demand a legal remedy;
if not in tort,6 at any rate in contract 7 or by means of a bill .in equityYs An in-
vestigation into the case material in this field will serve to define, with some
measure of precision, the nature and extent of an inventor's interests; 0 it can-
not answer the question whether the sum of those interests ought to be denom-
inated "property".
i. Lewis Products Co. v. Lewis, 57 F. (2d) 886 (E. D. Pa. 1931).
2. See Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U. S. 6o5, 612 (i888).
3. Durham v. Seymour, 161 U. S. 235 (1896).
4. Glass v. Kottwitz, 297 S. W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 927).
5. Cf. Saunders v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 29 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 3d,
1928) (A holding that the unpatented invention was assignable plus a statement that it is
"property").
6. Roystone v. Woodbury Institute, 67 Misc. 265, 122 N. Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct. igio),
(910) 24 HARV. L. REv. 69. Plaintiff brought trover for the conversion of a trade secret.
Recovery was denied, the court suggesting the remedy of an action of trespass on the case
against the individual who breached his duty of maintaining secrecy.
7. See cases cited infra, especially note 35.
8. See cases cited infra, especially notes 23-31.
9. Most of what is said will apply also to the trade secret which embodies a secret process
used in business, whether it be something that is patentable or not. The courts use the words
"invention" and "secret process" interchangeably in their discussions. For widely cited defini-
tions of "secret process" see Glucol Mfg. Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 75, 214 N. W. 152,
153 (927) ; National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 23 Ohio C. C. Decis. 468, 470 (1902).
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Most obvious of an inventor's rights is the right to a patent-in effect a
grant by the state of a monopoly of limited duration. in consideration of an
adequate public disclosure of the invention.' 0 This basic right, at least, appears
never to have been denied-subject, of course, to compliance with the statutory
requirements."- And protections against denial of the right are embodied in the
governing statute, which permits the inventor, his application for a patent hav-
ing been twice rejected by the primary examiner, to appeal to the board of exam-
iners in chief; thence to the commissioner in person; and finally to the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia. 12 The plaintiff may continue to pursue
his remedy by a bill ifi equity, which, if granted, governs the action of the com-
missioner.1" Where the commissioner's refusal to issue a patent is based on a
matter not within his discretion, a writ of mandamus may compel such issu-
ance.1
4
The right to a patent is subject to the condition that it be exercised within
two years of "publication" or disclosure of the invention."' It cannot be ex-
pected, therefore, that when the statutory protection is thus forfeited, the courts
will aid the inventor after his secret is published. As to what constitutes "pub-
lication", there is considerable difference of opinion; cases are generally decided
on their specific facts, ultimately by the jury.' But revelation to employees,' 7
or as the result of a contractual or confidential relationship,"s has apparently
never been termed "publication". Nor is the sale of a compounded article called
a publication of the formula or device used in its manufacture.'0
In the absence of his application for a patent, the inventor enjoys an im-
munity from any requirement of disclosure. Thus the statute protects him,
should he refuse, when on the witness stand, to disclose the details of his in-
vention or trade secret.'0 Moreover, he has the right, conditional upon his own
efforts to maintain secrecy, against all in contractual or confidential relationship
to him, that they shall neither use his invention themselves nor impart it to
others. And when the secret has been disclosed by an employee or anyone else
bound to respect it, equity will enjoin further use or disclosure by both the
offender and the third person.2 ' Mindful of the maxim that Equity will pro-
tect only a property right, many courts have denominated the right in an unpat-
ented invention a property right in order to bring cases of this nature Within
their jurisdiction, and grant whatever protection seemed equitable.2 Other
I0. 2 RonERTs, PATENTABILITY AND PATENT INTERPRETATION (1927) 885.
i. It is the only right recognized in Lewis Products Co. v. Lewis, 57 F. (2d) 886 (E.
D. Pa. i93I).
12. 16 STAT. 204 (1870), 35 U. S. C. A. §§ 57-59 (1929).
13. 16 STAT. 205 (1870), 35 U. S. C. A. §63 (1929).
14. Butterworth v. United States, 112 U. S. 5o (1884).
15. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. A. §3I (1929).
I6. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. -ibbs Mfg. Co., 21( Fed. 401 (C. C. W. D. Mich. I9O8);
Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, Io Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 154 (1887) ; McClary v. Hub-
bard, 97 Vt. 222, 122 Atl. 469 (1923). It is said that the measure of protection necessary is
that which is sufficient to prevent discovery by fair means-which indicates that the sufficiency
of the secrecy and the fairness of the discovery are mutually exclusive. In some cases the
word "secrecy" has been made practically meaningless, as where news is protected. Inter-
national News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (x918).
17. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
18. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co.; Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds; Mc-
Clary v. Hubbard, all supra note I6.
ig. Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12 (1889).
20. 6 STAT. 204 (,870), 35 U. S. C. A. § 56 (1929).
21. Stone v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 756, 55 Atl. 736 (1903) ; Macbeth-
Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (1913) ; Simmons Hardware Co. v.
Waibel, I S. D. 488,47 N. W. 814 (i8gi).
22. Herold v. Herold China and Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 911 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; Pea-
body v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) ; Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. W. 140
(1897); Glucol Mfg. Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 214 N. W. 152 (1927) ; Elaterite Paint Co.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
courts have stated that some right existed, and protected it without categoriz-
ing it merely because to them it seemed deserving of Equity's protection,23 the
owner's failure to secure a patent having deprived him of legal protection. In
either instance, however, the court presents a valid ground for equitable juris-
diction: namely, the prevention of a breach of contract, express or implied,
where the damages are incalculable and irreparable harm is threatened; 2 or
a breach of trust.3 The tendency to apply these grounds concurrently indicates
how uncertain is the distinction between them. It has been suggested that
Equity should protect such rights as these simply because the law has failed to
protect them fully rather than attempt to cloak them in the name of property
for the purpose of securing jurisdiction.28
In fact, cases are rare in which the inventor's relations with the offender
have embraced an express provision for concealment of the information en-
trusted. Generally, therefore, the court must "imply" a contract to that effect.
Thus a former employee is enjoined from using competitively the trade secrets
of his employer.2 Or a machinist is enjoined from making further use of the
new patterns whose measurements he copied when the instrument was left with
him for repairs; and the competitor to whom he revealed them, is enjoined from
making use of the information. 28  On the other hand, those unconnected with
the inventor's business, whose knowledge of his processes has resulted from
his own insufficient care to prevent it, are said to have acquired the knowledge
by fair means, and therefore to be entitled to it.29 In the light of decisions like
these what has become of the assertion that a "property right" is or is not in-
volved? Mr. Justice Holmes suggests the key: 30
"The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary
fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.
The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be."
An inventor has not only the right to retain exclusive possession of his in-
vention, but also the significant and extensive power to transfer it to another.
The statute which provides for the governmental grant of a patent, itself recog-
nizes the assignability of an inventor's interest, and allows for the grant of a
patent to the assignee if the assignment is recorded.31 In the absence of record-
ing, it has been held that the inventor, having received a patent after his assign-
v. Frost Co., IO5 Minn. 239, 117 N. W. 388 (igo8) ; Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, io
Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 154 (1887) ; Simmons Hardware 'Co. v. Waibel, i S. D. 488, 47 N. W.
814 (18gi). And see Note (292o) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 65; Robinette, Protection of Prop-
erty Interests in Equity (1932) I0 CAN. B. REV. 172, 177.
23. Salomon v. Hertz, 4o N. J. Eq. 40o (1885) ; Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can
Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 387, 67 Atl. 339 (9o7) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 79 Hun 183
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1894) ; Sterling Varnish Co. v. Macon, 217 Pa. 7, 66 Atl. 78 (1907) ; Bel-
mont Laboratories, Inc. v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 151 Atl. 15 (293o) ; Morrison v. Moat, 21 L. J.
Ch. 248 (1852) ; Note (1929) 39 COL L. REv. 233.
24. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Simmons, 81 Fed. 163 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1897) ; Witkop &
Holmes Co. v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 69 Misc, 9o, 124 N. Y. Supp. 956 (Sup. Ct.
igio) ; Fralich v. Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 30 Atl. 521 (1894).
25. Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F. (2d) 293 (N. D. Ill. 1929);
Westervelt v. National Paper and Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 57 N. E. 552 (19oo) ; Macbeth-
Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (913).
26. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33 YALE. L. J. 115,
132.
27. Scavengers' Protective Ass'n v. Serv-U-Garbage Co., 228 Cal. 568, 24 P. (2d) 489
(933).
28. Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12 (1889).
29. McClary v. Hubbard, 97 Vt. 222, 122 Atl. 469 (1923).
30. Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 200, 102 (2917).
31. 16 STAT. 583 (3872), 35 U. S. C. A. §44 (2929). Power to devise an unpatented in-
vention is conferred by 35 STAT. 245 (1908), 35 U. S. C. A. §46 (2929).
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ment, must transfer it to the assignee. 32  The power to assign extends not only
to inventions conceived though unpatented, but also to those likely or possible
of conception in the future. Thus an employee may assign to his employer his
interest in all inventions to be conceived by him during the period of employ-
ment; and the validity of such contracts has been upheld by the courts.33 But,
the comment of Judge Lindley indicates that this ruling was made with reluct-
ance: 84
"There is a modern economic philosophy to the effect that earned in-
come should be more liberally returned to the individual making it possible,
but until such policy shall be reflected in legislation invalidating a sale of
inventive labor, this court is powerless to afford relief against situations
which parties, mentally competent, have created for themselves."
It follows that contracts involving the transfer of an invention patentable
but unpatented are not void for lack of consideration.3 5 On the contrary, the
inventor may recover in a suit for royalties,3 6 or for specific enforcement.3 7 So
also, an unpatented invention constitutes valuable consideration for the creation
of fully paid corporate shares; 88 except where the invention is of such a char-
acter as to raise a reasonably well-founded suspicion that the transfer repre-
sented merely an attempt to circumvent certain statutes forbidding the watering
of stock."
Cases of this last sort raise the question as to whether consideration can
ever be said to exist where the invention was unpatentable, or where for some
reason the patent which the inventor attempted to transfer, was void. Where
the intention of the parties was to transfer a patent right, the invalidity of the
patent is a defense to an action for the purchase price.," But a transferee is
liable for royalties until such patent is declared void.41  He is held to have
received all he bargained for, the assignment of an invention containing no
implied warranty of its patentability.
The complex of the inventor's relations toward his product includes also
the power to make that product the res of a trust. The most prominent exam-
ple of a trade secret as a trust res is the century-old case of Green v. Folgham.42
Cases since then have been rare; but the rule apparently is unquestioned.
43
Where his secret is one easily guarded, the well-informed inventor may, by
establishing a trust in his device, insure it a useful and protected life longer
32. New Era Range Co. v. Serrell, 252 N. Y. io7, i69 N. E. io5 (1929). Cf. Pomeroy
Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293, 78 AtI. 698 (I9io) ; Ebsary Gypsum Co. v. Ruby, 256
N. Y. 406, 176 N. E. 820 (1931).
33. DuPont Rayon Co. v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 290 (N. D. Ill. 1933). Cf. New Jersey Zinc
Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), reV'g, 4 F. Supp. 967 (S. D. N. Y.
1933) (employee has property in his subsequent improvements on patents assigned to em-
ployer).34. DuPont Rayon Co. v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 29o at 292 (N. D. Ill. 1933).
35. La Chapelle v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 272 Mass. 465, 172 N. E. 586 (i93o);
Kroegher v. McConway and Torley Co., 149 Pa. 444, 23 Atl. 341 (1892).
36. Ingraham v. Schaum and Uhlinger, i57 Pa. 88, 27 At. 404 (3893) ; Acme Chair and
Metal Crafts Co. v. Northern Corrugating Co., 209 Wis. 8, 244 N. W. 582 (1932).
37. National Gum and Mica Co. v. Braendly, 27 App. Div. 219, 51 N. Y. Supp. 93 (ist
Dep't i898) ; Silver Spring Co. v. Woolworth, i6 R. I. 729, i9 Ati. 52& (189o) ; Bryson v.
Whitehead, I Sim. & Stu. 74 (3822).
38. Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 6og (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
39. DODD, STOCK WATERING (3930) 51-52, 243 et seq.
40. Nye v. Raymond, i6 Ill. 153 (3854) ; Marston v. Swett, 66 N. Y. 2o6 (1876).
41. Acme Chair and Metal Crafts Co. v. Northern Corrugating Co., 209 Wis. 8, i9, :244
N. W. 582, 583 (932) ; Myers v. Gerhardt, 344 Ill. 62o, 176 N. E. 713 (193) ; Ingraham v.
Schaum and Uhlinger, 157 Pa. 88, 27 Atl. 404 (893).
42. 1 Sim. & Stu. 398 (1823).
43. i PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 67; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft No. I,
393o) § 8o, comments d and f.
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than the seventeen years granted by the statute. Only the rule against perpetui-
ties remains to limit its existence. The trust device may be invoked by law for
the protection of the inventor, where the idea has been wrongfully taken and
patented by another.4 4
The "property" concept enters again to confuse the problem as to whether
an unpatented invention is an asset which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.
A comprehensive phrase of the Bankruptcy Act states that the trustee will be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt to "property which
prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him". 45 The federal courts, reluctant to interpret this provision freely, held in
early cases that the trustee was not vested with the bankrupt's interest in pat-
entable inventions. Some of the courts even went so far as to deny that a bank-
rupt could be compelled to assign his interest under applications pending in the
Patent Office; 41 but this position was later reversed.47  A powerful dictum in
the early case of Fisher v. Cushnman suggested that unpatented inventions should
be treated as property within the Act.4" It was said that the term should be
construed not in the popular sense, but "with regard to the limitations which
the law attaches to it". The desirability of the latter construction is suggested
by the court's observation that the first interpretation allows a wily debtor to
put his remaining assets in such inventions before the adjudication of insolv-
ency, in order to place them beyond the reach of creditors.
Precisely such an artifice has been sanctioned by two state courts. The New
York court in Rosenthal v. Goldstein refused to compel the transfer of an un-
patented invention to the trustee in bankruptcy, even though it was a personal
asset of the bankrupt.4 9  In a recent decision, the Virginia court refused to
recognize a fraud on creditors where the bankrupt transferred a patentable
idea to his son, who secured the patent and sold it to a corporation for valuable
consideration. It has been suggested that the court could have constructed a
trust in the secret process and required the trustee to account to the creditors
or trustee in bankruptcy; 51 or that a trust resulted in favor of the one who
furnished the consideration.2 The New York court has lately indicated, how-
ever, that where a scrupulous bankrupt voluntarily assigns his invention to a
trustee in bankruptcy, the court will not interfere.
Any fear that the New York and Virginia cases may represent a trend,
is somewhat offset by the broad definition accorded the terms of the Act by a
South Carolina case.5 4 It should also be noted that the English court, in a sit-
uation similar to that in Rosenthal v. Goldstein, reached a contrary result.5
One writer has attempted to distinguish the cases on the ground that in the
44. Irving Iron Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 702, 126 At. 291
(924).
45. 30 STAT. 565 (i898), II U. S. C. A. § Iio (I927).
46. In re McDonnell, ioi Fed. 239 (N. D. Iowa 19oo) ; In re Dann, 129 Fed. 495 (N. D.
Ill. 1904).
47. In re Cantelo Mfg. Co., 185 Fed. 276 (D. Me. I9sI); In. re Myers-Wolf Mfg. Co.,
205 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913).
48. lO3 Fed. 86o, 864 (C. C. A. ist, 19oo).
49. 1i2 Misc. 6o6, 183 N. Y. Supp. 582 (Sup. Ct. 192o).
5o. Hise v. Grasty, 159 Va. 535, 166 S. E. 567 (1932).
5. (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 636.
52. (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 86I.
53. New Era Range Co. v. Serrell, 252 N. Y. io7, 169 N. E. io5l (1929); cf. Gillett v.
Bate, 86 N. Y. 87 (1881).
54. Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N. C. 454, 163 S. E. 572 (1932).
55. I re Keene, [1922] 2 Ch. 475; see Note (1923) 8 CoRN. L. Q. 174.
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English case the invention was used as a part of the insolvent's business, and
produced tangible profits therein; while in the latter case the invention was col-
lateral to the business. 56 It is difficult to see the significance of the distinction.
The purpose of bankruptcy acts is to make all the estate of a bankrupt legally
available for the payment of his debts."7 The bankrupt had diverted funds
which might otherwise have aided his business to stave off insolvency to the
purchase of an invention. That which was purchased with these funds should
therefore be applied to the satisfaction of creditor's claims.
Among the relations of the inventor to his invention must be noted a lia-
bility to taxation. s Although the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has held
that patent applications have no value for taxation purposes, the Board of Tax
Appeals has allowed values to patent applications and to inventions; and the
Board's holdings have been sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 Their
value must be determined for purposes of levying income taxes, and of deter-
mining invested capital under the excess profits tax statutes. Though in these
cases distinctions are made between patents, applications for patents, and inven-
tions unpatented, the distinctions bear not on the existence of the "property
right", but simply on value.6"
It should be noted, as a qualification upon much that has been said, that
courts of equity have denied protection to that species of new ideas, said to be
worthless unless communicated to others. Even New Jersey, generally liberal
in these matters, refused to enforce a promise by the defendant to share profits,
which was the alleged consideration for plaintiff's communication of his idea
for organizing a combination in the pig lead industry." It was recommended
that a remedy be sought in the law courts. But this remedy is clearly -inade-
quate because of the difficulty in calculating damages. 62  A further limitation
on the.type" of ideas which the courts will protect is that the idea must be
"new or exclusively within the plaintiff's knowledge". 3
Specific instances of ideas useless unless communicated, and therefore de-
nied protection, are to be found in dress models,64 and designs on materials used
for various commercial purposes.8 5 The courts, as has been indicated, refuse
to enjoin use by those who obtain the information "fairly", thus allowing the
designer a choice between gaining nothing by keeping the pattern to himself,
and gaining little by disclosing it. The problem has at any rate been recog-
nized. Justice Hand in an interesting summary doubts the possibility of any
56. (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 878.
57. English v. Richardson, 8o N. H. 364, 117 Atl. 287 (1922) ; Earle v. Maxwell, 86 S.
C. I, 67 S. E. 962 (igio).
58. In re Brandreth's Estate, 28 Misc. 468, 59 N. Y. Supp. lO92 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
59. Fallon, The Valuation of Patents in Taxation Proceedings (1934) 20 VA. L. REV.
539, 542.
6o. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 51 F. (2d) 681
(C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
61. Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 Atl. 436 (igo6), aff'd, 75 N. J. Eq. 330, 73 Atl.
1118 (19o8).
62. Fralich v. Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 3o Atl. 521 (1894) ; see Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jen-
kins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U. S. 689, 697 (1933).
63. Masline v. New York, N. H. & Hartford R. R., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639 (1921);
Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 2oI App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574 (2d Dep't 1922).
64. Montegut v. Hickson, 178 App. Div. 94, 164 N. Y. Supp. 858 (Ist Dep't 1917) ; Mar-
golis v. National Bellas Hess. Co., 139 Misc. 738, 249 N. Y. Supp. 175 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
65. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied,
281 U. S. 728 (193o) ; see ROBB, PATENT EsSENTIALS (1928) C. 10.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
solution under our existing laws.66  Codes established under the N. I. R. A.
have made some effort toward the protection of original designs.67
Enough has been said to indicate that the inventor who distrusts the effi-
cacy of the procedure established by Congress under its power to promote "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts",6 must find himself in a rather uncertain
position. The courts to whom he eventually turns 'for protection display a
unanimity of dicta strangely at variance with a diversity of holdings. All seem-
ingly assert that an invention is something to which some right may attach,
but few agree as to when to attach it.
The quarrel, however, is not with the fact that the courts' recognition
varies with the circumstances, but with their apparent assumption that the vari-
ance must don the mask of a generic term, and masquerade as uniformity. For
example, it might be recognized that there is no necessary inconsistency in pro-
tecting an invention before it has been wholly perfected, and refusing to protect
it a short time thereafter; or of denying its existence as property for the pur-
pose of withholding federal jurisdiction, and recognizing it as property for the
benefit of creditors in bankruptcy.
The desirability of some revision of the recognition accorded the interests
in an unpatented invention, may be evident from what has gone before. It is
clear that an inventor should be encouraged, by reasonable expectations of profit
and protection, to exercise his special ingenuity. It seems equally apparent
that, his product once completed, he should be spurred to the official disclosure
which benefits society while it adequately defines the inventor's interest. To
that end, it would doubtless be well to recognize interests in an undeveloped
invention, which cease to attach to the unpatented product at completion. On
the other hand, for the protection of creditors a liability may be permitted to
exist after the right is gone. A frankly functional approach could be expected
to produce decisions more uniformly in accord with social and economic desir-
ability.
F. E. H., Jr.
66. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
67. "The Code Authority shall set up a bureau for the registration of original and unique
designs and it shall adopt such regulations as the Administrator may approve for the purpose
of eliminating style piracy." Corset and Brassiere Code, Fair Trade Practise Rules (k) C. C.
H., INc., Federal Trade Regulation Service ff 8507. "The copying of design and/or patterns"
is listed under "unfair methods of competition". Wall Paper Code, VII (a), Id. f1 8518.
68. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, clause 8.
